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1Chapter 1 : Introduction
This thesis considers the possibility that the European Court of Human Rights is 
developing a role in relation to extreme restriction of access to abortion services, and 
the impairment of healthcare provision linked to such restriction, especially in Poland 
and Ireland. This thesis will argue that such development is necessary and that further 
development is likely because restrictive laws and practices are strongly associated 
with forms of suffering for women that can readily be captured in terms of rights-
violations. This likelihood is further enhanced since under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) it has not so far been accepted that the state can protect the 
right to life of the foetus as a fundamental human right. That stance corresponds with 
the majority European consensus in which the decision of the woman to seek an 
abortion is ultimately upheld in certain circumstances, including that of risk to the 
health of the woman and on social grounds, in the first trimester of pregnancy. 
This thesis sets out to explore the extent to which Strasbourg1 has already given 
recognition to rights’ violations due to restrictive access to abortion, and the potential, 
based on established Strasbourg principles, for it to take further steps in that direction 
in the future. A range of potential claims will be considered, but such recognition 
could most readily occur under the respect for private and/or family life heads of 
Article 8 ECHR in terms of health and the freedom to decide whether or not to 
terminate a pregnancy; also relevant are rights to life under Article 2, freedom from 
inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 and freedom from discrimination 
under Article 14.
Elaboration of the conceptual framework
Restrictive abortion regimes and creation of suffering for women
                                                
1 The term ‘Strasbourg’ will frequently be used in the thesis to refer to decisions of the European Court 
and Commission (now abolished but its decisions have made quite a significant contribution to the 
jurisprudence in this area) of Human Rights. The European Convention on Human Rights will be 
referred to as the ECHR or ‘the Convention’.
2The term ‘restrictive’ is used to mean that the regulation of abortion in the jurisdiction 
in question is particularly stringent in relation to the majority European standard. The 
state, which has responsibility for the restrictive abortion regime, causes suffering 
when it acts to restrict abortion or omits to act to ensure women’s access to a safe and 
legal abortion service that would preserve women’s health or life. Suffering occurs 
when women turn to illegal and often unsafe abortions or when they have to travel 
abroad for abortion, which may create stress and impairment of abortion after-care. 
The restrictive abortion regimes in Ireland and Poland are also associated with the 
impairment of access to general health care for women due to their reproductive 
function. For example, access to certain forms of treatment, such as to chemotherapy 
to treat cancer, may be impaired in practice, due to concern for the foetus.   
Relevance of the ECHR to potential rights’ violations in restrictive abortion regimes
The European Convention on Human Rights has the role of advancing respect for 
civil rights by providing an extra-national mechanism to raise particular violations of 
the rights it guarantees.2 The premise that the ECHR is relevant relies on the 
assumption that women undergo suffering due to extremely restrictive policies on the 
provision of abortion and that such suffering can be conceptualised as a violation of 
one of more of the ECHR guarantees. On that basis the state would have failed to 
fulfil a positive obligation to prevent a breach of women’s civil rights, or would have  
directly caused the breach.
Violations of rights under the ECHR by states with restrictive abortion regimes
By violations under the ECHR it is meant, for the purposes of this thesis, that relevant 
Articles of the Convention that protect the rights of the woman as a citizen in a 
country that is a signatory to the Convention are breached, either because the instance 
falls within the ambit of an unqualified right, or because it falls within a qualified one 
but the infringement cannot be justified.3 The application of the Convention Articles 
                                                
2 Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms at para 5.
3 In a thesis of this nature further exploration of the difference between the qualified, non-materially 
qualified and the qualified rights of the ECHR would not be appropriate: see further Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, Oxford OUP, 2009).
3is determined by their text and by reference to the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights in terms of: 1) the implications of current jurisprudence for 
the provision of abortion and related healthcare services in restrictive abortion 
regimes, and 2) the application of principles of the jurisprudence relating to certain 
Convention Articles to specific instances of suffering of women due to the nature of 
such regimes. When Strasbourg makes a determination as to the ambit of a certain 
right or as to justification for its infringement, it may concede a certain margin of 
appreciation to the state – a certain area of discretion – which may influence it in 
declining to intervene.4 Strasbourg may decide that due to the particular cultural or 
religious sensitivities surrounding an issue the state is better placed to take a particular 
stance on it than an international Court, finding therefore that the state has not over-
stepped its margin of appreciation in relation to the stance taken. Due to the 
sensitivity of the issue of abortion, the margin of appreciation doctrine has potential 
relevance to a determination of a rights violation. This thesis will explore the 
relevance of this doctrine in this context further in Chapter 5,5 but for present 
purposes it is most straightforward to consider it as possible route to avoidance of a 
finding of a violation of a Convention guarantee, in this context.
Lack of recognition of foetal interests as a fundamental right to life
It is assumed that for a violation of women’s human rights under the Convention to 
occur in relation to denial of services to women in restrictive abortion regimes, foetal 
interests cannot be recognised as amounting to a fundamental right to life protected by 
Article 2 at all stages of gestational development as this would justify almost all 
violations of women’s Convention rights. 
Literature review
This focus is not one that has been adopted so far in the academic writing on this 
issue, since an in-depth study of the ECHR and abortion has not yet been undertaken. 
                                                
4 See further Harris etc Law of the European Convention (n 3) at p 12-14; see generally G Letsas ‘Two 
concepts of the margin of appreciation’ (2006) 26 OJLS 705. 
5 Chap 5 pp 1-4.
4In contrast to the position in the US,6 very little attention has been paid to the 
potential for emergent abortion rights under the ECHR. The literature on the law and 
abortion issue falls roughly under five headings: firstly,  black letter discussion of 
abortion as a human right in terms of international and regional standards (Zampas 
and Gher, Cook),7 and there are various case-notes discussing Convention abortion 
cases (eg Priaulx);8 secondly, there is the literature discussing the status of life under 
the Convention (eg Plomer, Hewson);9 thirdly, there is a body of academic writing 
that attacks the idea of a right to an abortion under the European institutions, often 
from an ‘anti-choice’ position (Cornides);10 fourthly, there are general feminist/socio-
legal arguments that access to abortion should be a right (Sheldon, Jackson);11 fifthly, 
there are ethical analyses of the issue of abortion from the perspective of rights (eg 
Dworkin).12
This thesis will build on the black letter discussion of abortion rights in Zampas and 
Gher’s piece, but will focus only on the ECHR stance and potentialities. The lack of 
academic analysis of the Convention from the perspective advanced in this thesis has 
required a reliance on primary materials and alternative sources such as the literature 
of international organisations seeking to advance reproductive rights under the 
Convention, in particular, reports by the Centre for Reproductive Rights, the 
Federation for Polish Women and Family Planning and the Irish Family Planning 
Association, as well as reports and observations by bodies concerning human rights.   
                                                
6 See eg M Nussbaum ‘The Supreme Court, 2006 Term – Foreword Constitutions and Capabilities: 
Perception against Lofty Formalism [comments]’ (2007-2008) 121 Harv L Rev 4; B Siegel ‘The New 
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions’ [2007] U Ill L 
Rev 991; K Desrouleaux ‘Banning Partial-Birth Abortion At All Costs – Gonzales v. Carhart: Three 
Decades of Supreme Court Precedent Down the Drain’ (2007-2008) 35 SU L Rev 543; M Arnett 
‘Update: Phasing Out Abortion: One Step Closer to Terminating a Woman's Constitutional Right, in 
Gonzales v Carhart’ (2007) 24 T M Cooley L Rev 597.
7 JM Gher and C Zampas ‘Abortion as a Human Right: International and Regional Standards’ (2008) 8 
HRLR 249. R Cook and B Dickens ‘Human Rights Dynamic of Abortion Law Reform’ (2003) 25 
HRQ 1.
8 N Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation: Therapeutic Abortion, Reproductive ‘Rights’ and the 
Intriguing Case of Tysiąc v Poland’ (2008) 15 EJHL 361.
9 A Plomer ‘A Foetal Right to Life? The Case of Vo v France’ (2005) 5 HRLR 311. B Hewson 
‘Dancing on the Head of a Pin? Foetal Life and the European Convention’ (2005) 13 Fem LS 363.
10 J Cornides ‘Human Rights Pitted Against Man’ (2008) 12 Int J HR 107 at 115-21.
11 S Sheldon Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law (Pluto Press, 1997); E Jackson 
Regulating reproduction: law, technology and autonomy (Oxford, Hart, 2001) Ch 1.
12 R Dworkin Life’s Dominion: An Argument about abortion and euthanasia (Harper Collins, 1993) 
Ch 2.
5Context and Importance of thesis
Europe, the birthplace of the Enlightenment, is generally perceived as liberal, 
progressive and characterised by adherence to constitutionalism, democratic values 
and gender equality. European countries lead the world in recognising women’s 
rights, regardless of religious opposition and European institutions, in particular the 
European Union, have a strong commitment to combating sex discrimination and 
generally support women’s rights.13 However, this image of a modern, liberal Europe 
is not reflected in the approach to abortion regulation in a tiny handful of European 
countries in which the Catholic Church is dominant: while the majority ensure a 
reasonable level of access to abortion, there are very striking exceptions, most notably 
Ireland and Poland. Since lack of access to abortion is strongly associated with forms 
of suffering for women that can readily be captured in terms of rights-violations, the 
European Court of Human Rights has, this thesis will argue, a potential role in 
advancing recognition in certain circumstances of rights of access to abortion in line 
with the current and emerging European consensus. At this point in time, when cases 
concerning difficult bioethical issues are increasingly coming before the Strasbourg 
Court, the question of an emergent ‘right to an abortion’ is becoming one of 
increasing pertinence.14
This thesis is written at a time when the development of a common European 
approach to human rights in the context of termination of pregnancy is in its infancy 
due to the range of stances taken on the matter by the various European countries. A 
trend is discernable towards an incremental liberalising of laws governing access to 
abortion. But an opposing trend can also be discerned, in particular the currently 
discernible rise of conservative, religiously-based sentiment in certain European 
                                                
13 For example, the Treaty on European Union by Article 157 guarantees equal pay for equal work 
(Official Journal C 115 09/05/2008) and the Institutions of the European Union pursue this as a goal: 
see the work of the Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities division of the European 
Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm> accessed 29.09.10. 
14 See the Report of the Research Division of the ECtHR on Bioethics and the case-law of the ECHR, 
2009 < http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic> accessed 29.09.10 which demonstrates that this issue 
has been raised most frequently in recent and pending cases. 
6countries, particularly Poland,15 and the continuing influence of such sentiment in  
Ireland. The issue has caused an ongoing controversy in Ireland where three separate 
referendums have been called on the issue of abortion, although the restrictive regime 
has not been altered,16 and in Poland proposals to include explicit protection for life 
from conception were only rejected by Parliament in 2007.17 Moreover, the anti-
choice movement is currently strongly focused on the possibility of an emergent 
Strasbourg ‘abortion right’, and is fiercely campaigning against that possibility in 
various forums.18 A clash between feminist/liberal values and religious ones appears 
to be reaching a climax as this issue gathers greater momentum in human rights terms 
and comes closer to a resolution at Strasbourg.
The European Court of Human Rights has not yet developed any settled jurisprudence 
recognising a ‘right of access to an abortion’, and it cannot yet be said that Strasbourg 
fully recognises the human rights’ implications of failing to protect the access of 
women to a full range of health care services, or provides full recognition of a need to 
protect women’s reproductive choices in the pregnancy and abortion context. But the 
expectation that such protection will be established has recently gained greater 
momentum due to the efforts of a number of national and international NGOs active 
in the field of reproductive rights in Europe, most notably the Centre for Reproductive 
Rights,19 in supporting Strasbourg challenges.20
Running alongside these developments there have been extremely important 
institutional moves towards recognition of rights of access to abortion services, in 
                                                
15 AM Fernàndez Abortion: ‘Pro-life Tide’ CafeBabel.com The European Magazine 08.02.07 
<http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/19951/abortion-pro-life-tide.html> accessed 29.09.10. TG Jelen 
and C Wilcox ‘Continuity and Change in Attitudes Towards Abortion: Poland and the United States’ 
(2005) Pol & Gender (1) 2 297-317; A Czerwinski ‘Sex, Politics, and Religion: The Clash Between 
Poland and the European Union over Abortion’ (2003) 32 Denv J Int'l L & Pol'y 653. 
16 In 6 March 2002 Fianna Fail’s campaign for the Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Bill, which 
would have ruled out suicide as a ground abortion, was rejected.
17 The Polish president Lech Kaczynski was defeated in April 2007 on an amendment to the 
Constitution which would have protected life from conception: Z Dujisin ‘Poland: Abortion Laws not 
strong enough for some’ IPS News May 17th 2007 <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37759> 
accessed 29.09.10. See further N Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 8) at 379.
18 Eg The European Centre for Law and Justice <http://www.eclj.org/> accessed 29.09.10. 
19See at <http://reproductiverights.org/> accessed 29.09.10. The Center for Reproductive Rights is an 
established NGO well used to fielding human rights arguments in the global context.
20 These bodies are active in researching the impact on women of restrictive abortion laws, in 
particular the effects of the rise of unsafe, illegal abortions, risking women’s lives and health: see Gher 
& Zampas ‘Abortion as a Human Right’ (n 7) at 249.
7particular in the stance of the Council of Europe.21 Most significantly, in 2008 a 
Report was adopted by a majority of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, entitled Access to safe and legal abortion in Europe, calling upon member 
states to decriminalise abortion and guarantee women’s effective exercise of a right to 
safe, legal abortion.22 Furthermore, Strasbourg decided an abortion case in favour of 
the applicant for the first time in 2007 in Tysiąc v Poland,23 although as Priaulx puts 
it, ‘the Court attempted to distance itself from the substantive claim [of access to 
abortion]’.24 A number of treaties have a bearing on abortion rights – the ECtHR has 
often referred to The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
(ICCPR) and The Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination 
against women 1979 (CEDAW).25 Each of the aforementioned instruments protects to 
an extent the quality of life of the woman, which may include a threat to her health 
due to refusal of an abortion, and CEDAW Art 12 provides a right of women to non-
discrimination in the field of health care. Consideration of international law 
demonstrates that it generally favours the development of rights of access to 
abortion.26
Research questions 
The thesis sets out to consider the potential for development of the rights under the 
ECHR as a means of affording protection for access to abortion services and access of 
women to healthcare services available to the general population, taking account of 
the general European position and the suffering of women in certain European states. 
It considers the way that such suffering can be framed as violations of women’s rights 
                                                
21 There is also a report awaiting endorsement that supports legalisation of abortion services in the 
third world – Doc 11992 5 August 2009 ‘Fifteen years since the International Conference on 
Population and Development Programme of Action’ Report of the Social, Health and Family Affairs 
Committee, Rapporteur: C McCafferty.
22 Doc 11537 (8 April 2008) ‘Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in Europe’ Rapporteur: G Wurm 
Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men April 2008 at Pt A Paras 4 and 7.
23 Tysiąc v Poland (App no 5410/03) (2007) 45 EHRR 42 see further chapter 3 pp 4-7.
24 Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 8) at 363.
25 See further Cook & Dickens ‘Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform’ (n 7) at 1.
26 See also EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights ‘The Right to Conscientious 
Objection and the Conclusion By EU Member States of Concordats with The Holy See’ CFR-CDF 
Opinion No 4-2005 (14 December 2005) pp 17-22. As discussed in chapter 4, claims under the 
Convention are analogous to those argued before international tribunals: see eg Cook & Dickens 
‘Human Rights Dynamic of Abortion Law Reform’ (n 7) and Gher & Zampas ‘Abortion as a Human 
Right’ (n 7).
8under the ECHR by referring to established Strasbourg principles and canons of 
interpretation. To this end, firstly the thesis considers the dominant European 
approach to abortion services and sets out the restrictive European regimes; secondly 
the thesis examines the current stance of the Convention on restriction of services 
related to abortion and the related question of a foetal right to life; thirdly it examines 
the potential for development of rights to these services under the ECHR and the 
question of restriction of women’s access to health services generally due to their 
reproductive function in restrictive abortion regimes. As sub-questions linked to the 
third issue, it examines the question of the impact of relevant established Strasbourg 
principles; it examines the current and potential impact of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine and considers the possible influence of other aspects of international human 
rights law and policy on Strasbourg in this context. 
Route-map
This chapter introduces the whole thesis and sets out its parameters. Chapter 2 
discusses the nature of regulation of abortion in various European countries, dividing 
the discussion into various ‘models’ of abortion so as to highlight the dominant 
European approaches and the exceptions of Ireland and Poland. Chapter 3 discusses 
the current recognition under the European Convention on Human Rights of 
violations of women’s rights in restrictive abortion regimes, including consideration 
of the question of a right to life of the foetus. Chapter 4 considers the potential impact 
of international human rights law and policy on the development of rights to abortion 
under the Convention. Chapter 5 discusses the potential for development of further 
recognition that women’s rights are violated in restrictive abortion regimes drawing 
on relevant Strasbourg principles and referring to the various (unresolved) claims 
brought by current applicants;27 it discusses the role of the Court and further examines 
the potential impact of the margin of appreciation doctrine. Chapter 6 concludes the 
thesis by evaluating the current and potential developments towards recognition of 
women’s rights in the context of restrictive abortion regimes under the Convention. 
                                                
27 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (App no 25579/05), lodged 15 July 2005 and Brüggemann and 
Scheuten v The Federal Republic of Germany (Decision) (App no 6959/75) (1977) 5 DR 103 at 108.
1Chapter 2 : Abortion services in Europe: consensus, exceptions and 
the role of the ECHR 
This Chapter seeks to demonstrate that a strong and increasing European consensus 
exists in favour of permitting the provision of access to abortion in the early stages of 
pregnancy, going on to consider the most significant exceptions to this permissive 
consensus. In order to do this the broad nature of the different approaches to abortion 
regulation in Europe will be set out. The categorisation of the European regimes will 
be based on that set out by Eser and Koch in their recent and authoritative analysis of 
abortion regimes in 64 countries. In their book Abortion and the Law1 they categorise 
abortion regimes as fitting three broad models – the ‘Prohibition model’, the ‘Medical 
Indications model’ and the ‘Time Limits Model’.2 The analysis below will take 
account of a fourth model recognised by commentators – the ‘counselling’ or ‘social 
grounds’ model.3 The Chapter will firstly set out the more permissive counselling and 
time limit models in order to demonstrate the nature of the majority European position 
on access to abortion and will go on to set out the nature of the regimes conforming to 
the restrictive models, in particular Poland and Ireland, indicating the impact that the 
ECHR has already had and making general points as to its potential relevance for 
those regimes. (Detailed argument as to the development under the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence of obligations of states to adopt a more permissive abortion regime 
under the ECHR Articles, and the possible further development of those obligations in 
accordance with Strasbourg principles, is presented in the subsequent Chapters.)
Permissive models of abortion laws: the European consensus
In interpreting the evolving substance of the guarantees in the Articles of the ECHR 
and the application of the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, the Court is influenced by 
the ‘developments and commonly accepted standards’ in the European member states 
                                                
1 A Eser and H Koch Abortion and the law; from international comparison to legal policy (TM Asser 
Press, The Hague, 2005).
2 Eser & Koch Abortion and the law p 46 et seq. 
3 S Gevers ‘Abortion Legislation and the Future of the Counselling model’ (2006) 13 EJHL 27, 29.
2that compose the Council of Europe.4 European regimes comprising 92% of the 
population of Europe permit the termination of a pregnancy as a choice of the woman 
at some point; by this it is not meant that most countries protect an unencumbered 
choice to have an abortion (women may have to satisfy certain further conditions such 
as attending counselling), but rather that ultimately the choice of the woman to 
terminate the pregnancy is capable of being respected in law. An incremental 
liberalising of laws governing access to abortion is discernable. The last three years 
have seen some important reversals in policy in certain countries: in July 2010 
abortion on request before 14 weeks was permitted in Spanish law,5 and in 2007 a 
Portuguese law came into force permitting abortion on request. after counselling,
before 10 weeks of gestation6 – the previous laws in those two countries permitted 
abortion only if the woman could advert to various indications such as grave risk to 
health or rape.7
(i) The Time Limits Model
The Time Limits Model describes a regime in which abortion availability is 
unrestricted before a certain time limit.8 Sweden is a typical example of this type of 
                                                
4 Tyrer v UK (A/26) 2 EHRR 1 para 31. See further chapter 5 pp 23-4 and G Letsas ‘Two concepts of 
the margin of appreciation’ (2006) 26 OJLS 705, 724-9.
5 C Giles ‘Spain’s Unrestricted Abortion Law Takes Effect’ Associated Press Agency 5th July 2010 
<http://www.salon.com/wires/health/2010/07/05/D9GOQ22O3_eu_spain_abortion/index.html> 
accessed 29.09.10. Reported also by the IPPF < http://www.ippf.org/NR/exeres/26DBE3CB-0B66-
47B1-AC9B-0C0B27DA767C.htm> accessed 29.09.10. 
6 M Queiroz ‘Legal Abortion After Decades of Struggle’ Inter Press Service News Agency (Feb 12th
2007); see at <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36534> accessed 29.09.10. 
7 Re Spain: Organic Law 9/1985 of 5 July, reforming Article 417 of Penal Code; Re Portugal: Law No 
6, Articles 139-141, 11 May 1984 and Law No 90, 30 July 1997.
8 In Eastern Europe reproductive health problems have been raised in relation to an over-reliance on 
abortion which has been indicated as being responsible for women undergoing unnecessary medical 
treatment leading to medical complications that risk the health or life of the women. See further SK 
Henshaw, S Singh and T Haas ‘The Incidence of Abortion Worldwide’ (1999) 25(Supplement) 
International Family Planning Perspectives S30–S38. This study found that Eastern Europe was the 
sub-region with the highest rate of abortions in the world, employing abortion as a form of 
contraception (Eastern Europe has a rate of 90 abortions per 1,000 pregnancies). See also T Baird, S 
Falk E Shehu ‘Shifting Focus to the Woman: Comprehensive Abortion Care in Central and Eastern 
Europe’ and E Ketting ‘Why Do Women Still Die of Abortion in a Country Where Abortion is Legal? 
The case of the Russian Federation’ (2005) in Entre-Nous The European Magazine for Sexual and 
Reproductive Health No 59 <http://www.euro.who.int/en/what-we-do/health-topics/Life-stages/sexual-
and-reproductive-health/publications/entre-nous/entre-nous> accessed on 10.10.10. That issue is 
outside the scope of this thesis.
3model – it allows abortion on request up to 18 weeks, and after this point requires the 
woman to demonstrate social or medical grounds.9
Countries adopting the Time limits Model10
Country† Population as % of 
European Total11
Gestational limit*
Spain12 7.5 14th week
Romania 4.1 14th week
Netherlands 3.1 13th week
Greece 2 12th week
Portugal13 2 10th week
Czech Republic 1.9 12th week
Serbia and Montenegro14 1.9 12th week
Belarus15 1.8 12th week
Sweden 1.7 18th week
Austria 1.5 12-13th week (3 months)
Bulgaria 1.3 12th week
Denmark 1 12th week
Slovak Republic 1 12th week
                                                
9 Abortion Act 595, 14 June 1974, amended May 1995 cited in International Planned Parenthood 
Federation ‘Abortion Legislation in Europe’ 8th edn (IPPF European Network, Jan 2007) at p59.
10 Information on abortion laws before 2007 is provided by the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation ‘Abortion Legislation in Europe’ (n 9).
11 Information from CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/> accessed 29.09.10. 
12 As of 5th July 2010: C Giles ‘Spain’s Unrestricted Abortion Law Takes Effect’ Associated Press 
Agency 5th July 2010 
<http://www.salon.com/wires/health/2010/07/05/D9GOQ22O3_eu_spain_abortion/index.html> 
accessed 29.09.10. Reported also by the IPPF < http://www.ippf.org/NR/exeres/26DBE3CB-0B66-
47B1-AC9B-0C0B27DA767C.htm> accessed 29.09.10. 
13 M Queiroz ‘Legal Abortion After Decades of Struggle’ Inter Press Service News Agency (Feb 12th
2007) <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36534> accessed 29.09.10. BBC World Service 
Portuguese abortion law in force <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6541143.stm> accessed 
29.09.10. 
14 Law concerning the conditions of and procedures for the termination of pregnancy, 1977 cited by 
the International Consortium for Medical Abortion <http://www.medicalabortionconsortium.org/law-
policy/CS/> accessed 29.09.10. 
15 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division ‘Abortion Policies: Global 
review’ <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/belarus1.doc> accessed 29.09.10. 
4Norway 0.9 12th week
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.8 10th week
Moldova 0.8 12th week
Albania 0.7 12th week
Latvia 0.4 12th week
Macedonia 0.4 10th week
Slovenia16 0.4 10th week
Estonia 0.2 12th week
Total 35.4%
*From conception or implantation.
†Micro-states or countries with a population less than 500,000 not listed.
(ii) The Counselling or Social Grounds model
The Counselling model describes regulation that seeks to oversee the reproductive 
choice of the pregnant woman, but not ultimately to deprive a woman of it, usually up 
to a time limit beyond which other grounds, such as serious risk to health, must be 
shown.17 A variation on this arises under the Social Grounds model whereby abortion 
is permitted for ‘social reasons’, such as poverty, or where the woman is a young 
teenager, up to a time limit.18 These are rather different approaches in law: the latter 
model bears a certain similarity to the more restrictive Medical Indications model
considered below in that it technically requires the woman to advert to external 
circumstances in order to obtain an abortion. But adverting to social grounds or to 
‘distress’ amounts in practice to a requirement that the woman has carefully 
considered her choice to abort.19 An example of this is provided by abortion 
regulation in the UK whereby abortion is prima facie illegal except in certain 
                                                
16 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division ‘Abortion Policies: Global 
review’ <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/slovenia.doc> accessed 29.09.10. 
17 Eser & Koch Abortion and the Law (n 1) at p 292-3 and Gevers ‘Abortion Legislation and the 
Future of the Counselling model’ (n 3) at 29.
18 See Eser & Koch Abortion and the Law (n 1) at p 37-8.
19 Gevers ‘Abortion Legislation and the Future of the Counselling model’ (n 3) at 29.
5circumstances,20 but it is in practice one of the more permissive regimes in Europe 
since abortion is permitted generally on the request of the woman up to 24 weeks 
gestation.21 A further example is provided Germany22 where legal abortion is 
available on request up to 12 weeks but this is contingent on establishing that the 
woman is in a state of ‘distress’ (in practice established by counselling).23
                                                
20 The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Ss 58 59 (the 1967 Act does not extend to Northern 
Ireland) and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 prohibits intentional ‘child destruction’ where the 
foetus is ‘capable of being born alive’ which is after 24 weeks gestation (no offences is committed if 
carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967). The term ‘born alive’ has been 
held to be breathing without aid of the mother (Rance v Mid-down Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587) 
and where there are no discernable signs of life: C v S [1988] QB 135. In the case of R v McDonald
[1999] NI 150 a man received 22 years imprisonment for attempted murder, rape and child destruction 
after stabbing his ex-partner with the intention of killing her and her unborn baby.
21 The Abortion Act 1967 s(1)(1)(a) states that abortion is permitted up to the 24th week of pregnancy 
where the continuance of the pregnancy involves risk of physical or mental injury to the pregnant 
woman or to existing children of her family; a doctor in determining this risk may take account of the 
actual or reasonably foreseeable environment (s1(2)) i.e. can take account of social considerations.
22 Abortion law was radically changed in 1993 when the country was reunified – Soviet era abortion 
law in East Germany was extremely permissive. See generally S Blay and R Piotrowicz ‘The Advance 
of German Unification and the Abortion Debate’ (1993) 14 Stat L Rev 171. 
23 International Planned Parenthood Federation ‘Abortion Legislation in Europe’ (n 9) at p 26.
24 Information from CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/> accessed 29.09.10. 
25 A Rahman, L Katzive and S Henshaw ‘A Global Review of Laws on Induced Abortion 1985-1997’ 
(1998) 24(2) International Family Planning Perspectives 56.
Country† Population as % of 
European Total24
Gestational limit*
Germany 15.3 12th week
France 11.3 12th week
UK 11.3 24th  week
Italy 10.8 12/13th week
Belgium 1.9 12th week
Hungary 1.8 12th week
Switzerland 1.4 10th week
Finland 1 12th week
Croatia25 0.8 12th week
6Countries adopting the Counselling or Social Grounds model26
*From conception or implantation. 
†Micro-states or countries with a population less than 500,000 not listed.
Restrictive models of abortion laws and the potential application of the ECHR 
As Chapter Four explains, the notion of conceptualising reproductive rights as human 
rights under international human rights law generally is currently an emergent one, 
but there are clear signs of a gathering momentum in that respect. The few regimes 
that retain extremely restrictive laws on the provision of abortion cause suffering to 
women in various ways which could be conceptualised as breaches of the Articles of 
the ECHR. There is firstly the effect on women who remain within the regime who 
either undergo unwanted pregnancy or seek out an often dangerous, illegal abortion 
(considered below);27 secondly there is the phenomenon of ‘abortion tourism’,28
whereby the woman seeking a termination travels to a near-by country that offers a 
more liberal regime (or, more rarely, a safer one). The patterns of such ‘abortion 
tourism’ in Europe have varied over the last 30-40 years as the liberality of the 
abortion regimes in the various states increases or declines.29 The state in question 
                                                
26 Information on abortion laws before 2007 is provided by the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation ‘Abortion Legislation in Europe’ (n 9).
27 The relationship between the safety and legality of abortion services has been well documented, for 
a recent example see A Mundigo ‘Determinants of Unsafe Induced Abortion in Developing Countries’ 
in I Warriner and I Shah (eds) Preventing Unsafe Abortion and its Consequences: Priorities for 
Research and Actions (Guttmacher Institute, New York 2006). See also generally R Sifris ‘Restrictive 
Regulation of Abortion and the Right to Health’ (2010) 18 Med L Rev 185, 198.
28 This could also be referred to as ‘reproductive choice tourism’ (as opposed to ‘reproductive 
tourism’). See on the issue of reproductive tourism, S Pattinson Medical Law and Ethics (2nd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2009) Ch 8 p268-9. 
29 In relation to second trimester abortions women currently travel from: Ireland, Northern Ireland, 
Portugal, Luxemburg, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Malta, Andorra, Monaco and even 
Britain. Women currently travel to: Spain, Netherlands, Britain: Presentation given by M Berer at the 
International Consortium for Medical Abortion in October 2008 as part of the Reproductive Health 
Matters series entitled Second trimester abortion in Europe <http://www.fiapac.org/> accessed 
29.09.10. 
Lithuania 0.7 12th week
Total 56.3%
7from which the woman seeks to travel can take steps to prevent or inhibit women 
from travelling abroad or to make it as physically and mentally stressful as possible
for them to do so,30 a policy that has the greatest impact in relation to socially 
disadvantaged women, such as teenage girls from poor families in small rural 
communities. The phenomenon of ‘abortion tourism’ in Europe means that when the 
resultant disadvantages suffered by women surface in challenges at Strasbourg, they 
tend to emerge as a mixture of claims, mainly, but not exclusively, relying on the 
protection of physical/mental integrity under Article 8, and the claim for reproductive 
autonomy may only be ancillary to claims relating to risks to life and health. 
(i) The Medical Indications model
This model describes abortion regulation that creates certain specific exceptions set 
out in law permitting abortion only where there is a threat to health, strictly defined as 
a medical issue; general social factors are excluded from consideration. Further 
narrow exemptions not necessarily related to the health of the woman may be 
available, such as abortion in respect of foetal impairment or where conception was as 
a result of rape. But these relate to maternal stress and mental health and therefore it is 
convenient to consider this model as referring primarily to medical indications. It is 
the most restrictive model of regulation for abortion services where abortion is still 
permissible. The fact that the state does permit abortion under this model means that 
human rights instruments such as the ECtHR and Council of Europe may oversee the 
working of the regime in practice rather than – in effect –  imposing exceptions as 
could arguably be the case where abortion is completely, or almost completely, 
prohibited. As subsequent chapters will attest, this model tends to create suffering for 
women in practice that is relatively easily captured as breaches of human rights 
guarantees under the ECHR. 
Countries adopting the Medical Indications model
                                                
30 One of the issues raised in ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (App no 25579/05), lodged 15 July 
2005 COMPLAINTS para 2, 3. See below p 13 and chapter 5 pp 4-7.
8Country Population as % of 
European Total31
Gestational limit:
Poland 7.1 12 weeks: rape, threat to 
health, foetal impairment
No limit: serious threat to 
health/life
Luxembourg 0.08 12 weeks: foetal 
impairment or threat to 
health 
No limit: serious threat to 
health/life
Total 7.2%
*From conception or implantation.
In Poland the provision of access to abortion is generally a criminal offence, although 
the pregnant woman herself is exempt from punishment;32 it is permitted only where 
there is a grave and serious threat to the health of the mother (this appears to include 
the risk of suicide), and in the cases of rape and serious foetal disability, as set out in 
the Family Planning (Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions Permitting 
Pregnancy Termination) Act 1993.33 This provision accords with the strict 
interpretation34 of Article 38 of the Polish Constitution which provides that the life of 
every human being is legally protected. A discrepancy can readily arise between the 
legal terms of the exceptions in the legislation for provision of abortion services and 
the practical access to such services since doctors consistently refuse to perform 
abortions, even where one of the permitted grounds applies, on grounds of 
                                                
31 Information from CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/> accessed 29.09.10. 
32 Carrying a 3 year prison sentence for anyone other than the pregnant woman who carries out an 
abortion Art 125(1) Criminal Code.
33 Statute Book 93.17.78 S(4)a1-5. This provision ruled out abortion on social grounds (which was 
previously available) and on request. This was briefly changed in 1996 to allow abortion until the 12th 
week of pregnancy if ‘a woman is in hard life conditions or in difficult personal situation’ but this was 
challenged subsequently by the Constitutional Tribunal on the basis that life is protected ‘at every 
stage’ under the Polish Constitution. (Poland) Constitutional Tribunal 28th May, 1997 K 26/96 at Pt 3 
Par 1. Translated and made available by Federa <http://www.federa.org.pl/english/constrib.htm> 
accessed 29.09.10. 
34 Followed by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, eg Ruling K 26/96 (1997).
9conscience.35 In Poland nationals are not directly restrained from travelling abroad to 
receive abortions,36 but the official stance is to favour prosecution of those who 
facilitate ‘abortion tourism’.37 As a result of this restrictive regime women often turn 
to unsafe, illegal abortions: the Federation for Polish Women and Family Planning 
(FEDERA) suggests that as many as 80,000 to 120,000 Polish women do so 
annually.38 Women also find it difficult to travel abroad for an abortion from Poland 
since so doing is expensive, costing women approximately £340-566,39 and there are 
few services to aid such women.40 Furthermore, since the position became much more 
restrictive after almost 40 years of the permissive approach, that meant that, as 
FEDERA argues, women, in particular those living in poverty, were denied a 
previously common form of birth control: 
Abortion on social grounds was legal in Poland since 1956 and it was broadly 
utilized by women as a method of birth control in result of poor family planning 
policies of the Polish state. The state did not introduce simultaneously with 
restrictions any policies that would promote and subsidize any family planning 
                                                
35 See the entry on Poland in Amnesty International’s Briefing to the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 43rd Session, Nov 2009. Amnesty found that Poland was denying access to 
abortion for eligible women,’ citing criticism that Poland had received from the Human Rights Council 
(HRC) in May 2008. The Amnesty report stated: ‘Women are experiencing pain and suffering, and in 
some cases loss of life, as a direct result of the deliberate denial of medically indicated treatment to 
pregnant women’ (at p 1) also see on this point p 13.
36 Family planning, Protection of human foetus and conditions of Admissibility 7 January 1993, 
Article 1. A detailed examination of effects including prosecutions for travelling was made by the 
Polish group Federation for Women and Family Planning in their 1996 Report 
<http://www.federa.org.pl/english/report96/rap96_1.htm> accessed 29.09.10. 
37 A Ratajczak, 'Democratic Legal State in Totalitarian Wrapping', Rzeczpospolita daily paper, 
6.11.1995 cited by FEDERA The effects of the anti-abortion law (Feb 1996) Report No 2 at para 5 
<http://www.federa.org.pl/english/report96/rap96_1.htm> accessed 29.09.10. 
38 Estimates vary significantly – official figures for abortion in Poland were 123,000 in 1987; 
however, ‘...some estimates suggest that the actual number of abortions performed may have been from 
three to four times the official number. Underground private abortion services are robust in Poland, as 
is ‘tourism’ abortion by Polish women who travel to neighbouring countries including, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Holland, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia 
and Ukraine. Rough 1996 estimates suggest there may be 50,000 underground abortions a year.’ UN 
Population Division Department of Social and Economic Affairs Abortion Policies A Global Review 
(United Nations, 2005) at 39 <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/> accessed 
29.09.10. In relation to Irish figures see n 73; see further Human Rights Watch ‘A State of Isolation: 
The State of Abortion for Women in Ireland’ (Jan 2010); see at 
<http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/01/28/state-isolation> accessed 29.09.10. 
39 W Nowicka (ed) Reproductive Rights in Poland – the effects of the anti-abortion law (Mar 2008)
available: <http://www.federa.org.pl/publikacje/report%20Federa_eng_NET.PDF> accessed 29.09.10
at p 27.
40 FEDERA characterise such ‘abortion tourism’ in Poland as having an ‘individual, unorganised 
character.’ W Nowicka (ed) Reproductive Rights in Poland (n 40) at p 18 and 26.
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programmes. This dramatic change affected seriously many women and 
families, particularly those poor and uneducated ones. The law did not stop 
abortions. It pushed women to use back-street abortions or travel abroad. These 
effects of anti-abortion regulations on women’s life and health were described 
in the Federation for Women and Family Planning’s three reports (1994,1996, 
2000).41
FEDERA stresses that in Eastern Europe in general the prevalence of abortion is far 
higher than in Poland; as a result the Polish regime has led to the creation of a large 
underground abortion network.42 Over the years 1999-2006 there were 500 
prosecutions for abortion related offences; this is a relatively small number, 
considering the many thousands of illegal abortions that take place,43 suggesting that 
the Polish authorities may connive at reliance on illegal abortions in order to create 
some alleviation of this social problem without confronting it openly.
The Centre for Reproductive Rights and the Federation for Polish Women have 
emphasised the culture of antipathy towards women seeking abortion, even where it is 
technically legal. This formed the background to Tysiąc v Poland,44 a highly 
significant decision under the ECHR, discussed further in subsequent chapters, in 
which the applicant complained that although she fulfilled the requirements for a legal 
abortion, since it was necessary to preserve her eyesight, she was in effect denied one 
by doctors, with the result that her condition severely worsened and she became near-
blind. The Strasbourg Court upheld Tysiąc’s complaints that this denial had created a 
breach of Article 8 of the Convention; while this decision did not require Poland to 
make a fundamental change to its restrictive regime, it was broadly considered to 
                                                
41 Polish Federation for Family Planning and Women ‘Abortion Law; Discriminatory Consequences 
of the Anti-abortion Law’ <http://www.federa.org.pl/?page=article&catid=798&lang=2> accessed 
29.09.10. See also the latest report by FEDERA: W Nowicka (ed) Reproductive Rights in Poland – the 
effects of the anti-abortion law (Mar 2008) available: 
<http://www.federa.org.pl/publikacje/report%20Federa_eng_NET.PDF> accessed 29.09.10 and 
FEDERA’s submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in connection 
with the Fifth Periodic Review of Poland, July 2009 at p8-9 available at < 
http://www.federa.org.pl/?page=article&catid=879&lang=2> accessed 29.09.10. 
42 W Nowicka (ed) Reproductive Rights in Poland (n 40) at p 27-28.
43 W Nowicka (ed) Reproductive Rights in Poland (n 40) at p 28-31.
44 Tysiąc v Poland (App no 5410/03) (2007) 45 EHRR 42.
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demand a relaxation of it,45 for reasons that will become apparent in Chapter 3. The 
result in Tysiąc led, after a year’s delay, to the enactment of the Patients’ Rights and 
the Ombudsman for Patients’ Rights Act 2009, intended to provide a mechanism for 
challenging decisions of health professionals; it is not linked specifically to abortion 
services. Amnesty International, however, considers that the new provision is 
inadequate and that Poland ‘continues to fail to meet its obligations to ensure access 
to effective remedies at the national level aimed at ensuring women’s right to the 
highest attainable standard of health, without discrimination’46 a finding echoed by 
the UN Human Rights Council in its mission to Poland.47 FEDERA has further noted 
that Polish women cannot always access prenatal tests that would enable them to 
access abortion on genetic grounds.48
(ii) The Prohibition model
The Prohibition model describes regimes in which ‘abortion is not only generally 
prohibited but in which, in addition, no express exceptions are granted, so that the 
only way for a termination to remain unpunished follows from general legal 
principles’.49 Very few sizeable countries adopt this model in Europe (and the ‘West’ 
in general) but as Ireland retains such a restrictive model it is necessary to consider its 
implications for women. 
Countries Adopting the Prohibition model
Country Population as % of 
European Total50
                                                
45 N Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation: Therapeutic Abortion, Reproductive ‘Rights’ and 
the Intriguing Case of Tysiąc v Poland’ (2008) 15 EJHL 361 at 375-6.
46 See the 2009 Amnesty Report (n 35) at [3.5].
47 United Nations General Assembly Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health Human Rights Council 14th
Session, 20 May 2010 A/HRC/14/20/Add.3.
48 FEDERA’s submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
connection with the Fifth Periodic Review of Poland, July 2009 (n 41) at p 8-9. 
49 Eser & Koch Abortion and the Law (n 1) at p 46.
50 Information from CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-







A straightforward example of this model is provided by the traditionally deeply 
Catholic state of Malta, which enshrines allegiance to Catholicism in its 
Constitution.54 Under the Criminal Code of Malta, abortion is prohibited in all 
circumstances, with no express exception to save the life of the woman,55 although 
Maltese law may possibly excuse abortion in circumstances where the life of the 
mother is threatened by continuance of the pregnancy, under general criminal law 
principles of necessity.56 However, specific provisions allowing an abortion to be 
performed for that purpose were removed from the Code in 1981. The person 
performing the abortion is subject to 18 months-three years’ imprisonment, as is a 
woman who performs an abortion on herself or consents to its performance. A 
physician, surgeon, obstetrician, or apothecary who performs an abortion is subject to 
18 months-four years imprisonment and lifelong prohibition from exercising his or 
her profession. However, Malta is unlikely to see a challenge to this restrictive regime 
under the Convention due to its very small size and the availability of abortion in 
neighbouring countries.
It is the adherence of Ireland to this model that creates significant suffering for a large 
number of women and is creating the likelihood that the Prohibition model could be 
                                                
51 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division ‘Abortion Policies: Global 
review’ <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/malta.doc> accessed 29.09.10. 
52 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division ‘Abortion Policies: Global 
review’ <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/sanmarino.doc> accessed 29.09.10. 
53 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division ‘Abortion Policies: Global 
review’ <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/monaco.doc> accessed 29.09.10. 
54 Chapter 1, Article 2 (1) of the Maltese Constitution gives Catholic authorities the ‘duty and the right 
to teach which principles are right and which are wrong to all Maltese’.
55 By Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta abortion cannot be performed to save the life of the woman or in 
cases of rape, incest or foetal abnormality.
56 It is unclear whether those performing or aiding an abortion could rely on the defence of necessity 
as set out by Article 241 Criminal Code.
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challenged before the ECHR. The strict regime is due to the protection accorded to 
the foetus under Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution which reads: 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to 
the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as 
far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. 
This appears to give the foetus equal status with the mother, except where the 
woman’s life is put at risk by the continuance of the pregnancy.57 However, since this 
exception has no express statutory basis, but exists only as an interpretation of the 
Constitution, the Irish position is placed by commentators within the Prohibition 
model.58 The lack of access to abortion on the ground of a serious risk to the mother’s 
health is arguably the most striking gap in the protection for women available under 
current Irish law. No further exceptions in cases of rape or of severe foetal 
abnormality are available. The absence of an exception in cases of fatal foetal 
abnormality has created political controversy in Ireland; the government took steps in 
2000 to reconsider the question of allowing such an exception, a measure which an 
influential group of Irish gynaecologists strongly recommended,59 but this ultimately 
came to nothing due to religiously motivated political in-fighting over the issue.60 The 
failure to provide these further exceptions appears to be increasingly out of line with 
Irish public opinion, and in particular with female opinion.61 The lack of legislation 
was trenchantly criticised by the Irish Supreme Court in the X case:
In the context of the eight years that have passed since the Amendment was 
adopted… the failure by the legislature to enact the appropriate legislation is 
no longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable.62
                                                
57 Article 40.3.3 as interpreted in Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1 at para 118 et seq.
58 Eser & Koch Abortion and the Law (n 1) Diagram 11/1 p 63.
59 The Oriechtas Committee on the Constitution 5th Progress Report (2000, Stationary Office Dublin) 
accessible at <http://www.constitution.ie/reports/5th-Report-Abortion.pdf> accessed 29.09.10 para 40.
60 See eg The Interdepartmental Working Group Green Paper on Abortion, September 1999 at 4.20-8.
61 Opinion polls and research consistently show increased support for access to abortion. In 2004 a 
Crisis Pregnancy Agency study found that 90% of 18-45 year olds support abortion in certain 
circumstances, 51% stating that women should always have to right to choose an abortion. In 2007, an 
Irish Times Behaviour and Attitudes Poll found that 54% of women believe the government should act 
to permit abortion. 
62 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1 at 147.
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The ECHR, as a mechanism to protect human rights where the political process has 
failed to do so, therefore clearly has a potential role in relation to this issue.
In Ireland the Constitutional position is echoed in the criminal law: procuring an 
abortion is a criminal offence (Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, sections 58 
and 59);63 a woman ‘unlawfully’ having or attempting to have an abortion, and 
anyone assisting her, may be penalised in law (although as Irish law is subject to the 
Constitution an exception to the offence exists where the women’s life is 
endangered)64 and no general principle of necessity has so far been recognised to 
provide that abortion may be ‘lawful’ in extreme circumstances such as rape, as has 
been recognised in other jurisdictions which have, or used to have, similarly worded 
laws.65 The penalty is life imprisonment (s58 OAPA), while those assisting in such 
may be imprisoned for 3 years (s59 OAPA). Clearly, if a woman sought to undergo an 
illegal abortion in Ireland and was convicted of this offence, it would be unlikely that 
the full penalty would be imposed, but in ECHR terms, the significance lies in the fact 
that such an exceptionally draconian penalty is available.66 In the case of X,67 relying 
on statements in McGee,68 an exception to the prohibition where there was a ‘real and 
substantial’ risk to woman’s life was recognised, which meant that the real risk of 
suicide69 could create a positive obligation on the state to provide abortion for those in 
its care. However, this definition has created some political controversy in Ireland in 
so far as it is applied to suicide: in 2002 the 25th Amendment to the Constitution 
                                                
63 Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, sections 58 and 59 set out the offence of ‘procuring a 
miscarriage’. This offence has been affirmed by the legislature by s 10 of the Health (Family Planning) 
Act 1979: see further S Drislane ‘Abortion and the Medical Profession in Ireland’ (2009) 15 MLJI 35, 
35. 
64 Attorney General v X (n 62) at 146.
65 That was the position in England after R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; the Irish Courts have not so far 
accepted the judgment and have referred to its incompatibility with the Irish position: Society for the 
Protection of the Unborn Child v Grogan, judgment of March 6 1997 (unreported) at p7 per Keane J. 
The judgment in Bourne was partly based on the explicit proviso in the English Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act 1929 s1(1) that the offence would not apply if the act was done in good faith for the 
preservation of the life of the mother (R v Bourne at para 6) which was not replicated in Irish law.
66 See eg Dudgeon v United Kingdom (App no 7525/76) (1982) 4 EHRR 149, and see discussion of 
this in Chapter 5 text to note 26. 
67 Attorney General v X (n 62).
68 [1974] IR 284 at 284, 315.
69 This was confirmed subsequently in A & B v Eastern Health Board, Mary Fahy, C and the Attorney 
General (notice party) [1998] 4 IR 464 at 34.
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(Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy) Bill, which would have removed suicide as 
an exception to the prohibition, was put to the electorate, but it was rejected. 
This exceptionally restrictive regime means that women resort to illegal abortions or 
travel abroad to obtain abortions. However, the state has sought to prevent women 
travelling to neighbouring countries to obtain an abortion. This issue was raised in the 
Constitutional court in the X case in 1992.70 The Court overturned a High Court 
injunction preventing a 14 year old girl travelling to England for an abortion where 
her pregnancy was a result of rape and the girl was at risk of committing suicide.71
Understandably, this case generated considerable domestic sympathy and led to the 
13th Amendment to the Constitution which explicitly prevented the state interfering 
with its citizens’ ability to travel abroad in order to protect the life of the unborn.72 A 
considerable number of women travel abroad annually for abortions from Ireland.73
But due to the fact that the Constitutional Amendment permitting travel abroad for 
abortion is framed in negative terms, there is a lack of clarity as to whether those 
under the control of the state may obtain abortion abroad, which can put vulnerable 
members of society, such as teenagers in care homes, who are under the care and 
control of the state, in a difficult and uncertain position.74 An example of this occurred 
                                                
70 Initially the Supreme Court in Attorney General v X (n 62) para 62 it was held that travel to obtain 
an abortion could be restricted, but this interpretation of the Constitution was overturned by 
referendum. After the November 1992 referendum the Thirteenth Amendment was added which reads 
as follows: ‘This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state’. In 
relation to the provision of information about external abortion it was initially held by the Supreme 
Court that Art 40.3.3 required the placing of restrictions on such material Attorney General (SPUC) v 
Open Door Counselling [1988] IR 593.
71Attorney General v X (n 62) at para 2 et seq.
72 13th Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1992.
73 Recent figures for those giving Irish addresses in UK abortion clinics put the figure at around 4,500, 
but this is likely to be an underestimate of the total number travelling. The UK Department of Health 
figures on those performing abortions giving addresses in Ireland in 2008 was 4,600: Department of 
Health UK ‘Number of Women Giving Irish Addresses at UK Abortion Clinics Decreases for Seventh 
Year in a Row According to Department of Health UK’ (Crisis Pregnancy Agency press release, June 
2008). Between January 1980 and December 2008, at least 137,618 women travelled from the Republic 
of Ireland for abortion services in Britain. An increasing number of women are accessing safe and legal 
abortion services in EU countries other than the UK. According to the Crisis Pregnancy Agency, 331 
women from the Republic of Ireland travelled to the Netherlands for safe and legal abortion services in 
2008 and 451 women in 2007.
74 The state has on occasion funded travel for this purpose: see the Submission of the Irish Family 
Planning Association to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women May 
2005 <http://www.ifpa.ie/eng> accessed 29.09.10 at p 3 and the facts of A & B v Eastern Health 
Board, Mary Fahy, C and the Attorney General (notice party) [1998] 4 IR 464 at 34. See also as 
regards uncertainty on this issue, the Comments of the Irish Family Planning Association in respect of 
the Third Periodic Report of Ireland under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
June 2008; see at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/> accessed 29.09.10. 
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as recently as 2007 in the case of ‘Miss D’, an Irish teenager in care who wished to 
have an abortion, having found that she was carrying an anencephalic foetus.75 The 
Health Service Executive attempted to prevent her travelling by seeking the 
withdrawal of her passport; ultimately she was only able to travel after obtaining a 
High Court injunction based on her constitutionally guaranteed right to travel.76
Somewhat similar legal developments occurred in the early 1990s in relation to the 
provision of information domestically in relation to abortion services abroad. In this 
instance development was prompted by the ECtHR ruling in the case of Open Door 
Counselling v Ireland.77 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children sought a 
declaration that the applicant, an abortion counselling service, was acting unlawfully 
in providing information on abortion services abroad. This was duly granted by the 
High Court and upheld by the Irish Constitutional Court78 on the basis that there was 
no constitutional right to speech which ‘if availed of, would have the direct 
consequence of destroying the... right to life of the unborn’.79
The Strasbourg Court subsequently decided that the state was required to refrain from 
an absolute prohibition on the provision of such information since that stance was 
contrary to Article 10 of the ECHR (which protects freedom of speech).80 The detail 
of the substantive decision will be addressed in the next chapter. In response to the 
ruling provision was made in Ireland that information could be made available,81 but a 
number of limitations were imposed. The nature of counselling on abortion was 
limited so that ‘professional counsellors may only provide abortion information after 
full non-directive pregnancy counselling,’82 and the information as to abortion 
services that could be given was restricted. Thus, while abortion counselling services 
                                                
75 Comments of the Irish Family Planning Association Third Periodic Review of Ireland under the 
ICCPR (n 74).
76 See for further discussion of litigation at the ECHR on this issue, chapter 5 p 10-11.
77 Open Door Counselling Ltd and Dublin Well Women Centre Ltd and others v Ireland (App No 
14234/88) (1993) 15 EHRR 244. See also chapter 3 text to n 43.
78 Attorney General (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling [1988] IR 593.
79 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 77) at para 19.
80 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 77) at para 77.
81 Ie it can be divulged by bodies within Ireland such as the Irish Family Planning Association.
82 Regulation of Information (Termination of Pregnancies Outside the State) Act 1995 cited in 
International Planned Parenthood Federation ‘Abortion Legislation in Europe’ (8th edn IPPF European 
Network, Jan 2007) at p 31.
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are therefore able to provide some basic information in Ireland on abortion services 
abroad, the vital service that such agencies could provide by way of providing a full 
link between abortion providers abroad and local medical services is severely 
hampered by this law.83 The provision also creates legitimacy for counselling services 
which mislead women as to the effects of abortion in order to discourage them from 
having an abortion, a matter highlighted by Human Rights Watch.84 Therefore the 
European Court of Human Rights may have to revisit Ireland’s highly restrictive 
provisions on this issue, which may be putting women at risk.  
The UN Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has 
repeatedly highlighted the suffering caused to Irish women by the lack of access to 
abortion and to related health care services, by the criminal penalties applicable, and 
the related physical, social and mental effects on women, especially more vulnerable 
girls and women.85 Human Rights Watch has also become involved in Ireland, noting 
similar issues in its recent report in January 2010 ‘A State of Isolation: Access to 
Abortion for Women in Ireland’.86 The Safe and Legal (in Ireland) Abortion Rights 
Campaign, launched in August 2005,87 is currently supporting a challenge to the Irish 
prohibition on abortion at Strasbourg, the case of ABC v Ireland,88 an application 
brought by three women who were forced to travel abroad to the United Kingdom to 
receive abortions in difficult circumstances involving medical complications. The 
application highlights the problems89 caused indirectly by the Irish regime in forcing 
Irish women to undergo unnecessarily expensive, delayed and stressful abortion 
procedures and in severely reducing the effectiveness of the subsequent medical 
oversight of the procedure. If ABC is successful, or partially successful, at Strasbourg 
it could have the effect of encouraging Ireland to develop a domestic policy towards 
abortion regulation rather than, in a sense, relying on its neighbours to the detriment 
                                                
83 Human Rights Watch ‘A State of Isolation: The State of Abortion for Women in Ireland’ (Jan 2010) 
at p 1-2 <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/01/28/state-isolation> accessed 29.09.10. 
84 Human Rights Watch ‘A State of Isolation’ (n 83) at pt V.
85 Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 33rd Session July 2005, 
(CEDAW/C/IRL/4-5) and 21st Session, June 1999 (CEDAW/C/IRL/2-3).
86 Human Rights Watch ‘A State of Isolation’ (n 83).
87 For more information see <http://www.safeandlegalinireland.ie/sl_aboutcam.html> accessed 
19/09/09.
88 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (App no 25579/05), lodged 15 July 2005.
89 The substance of the guarantees in international human rights law which apply to restrictive regimes 
will be considered in Chapter 4.
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of elements of its population. The possibility of such an outcome in ABC and its likely 
form is considered in Chapter 5.
Conclusion
It may be concluded that there is a role for the creation of rights to abortion services 
under the Convention to address the suffering created by the restrictive regimes. 
Rights’ violations could be or already have been claimed (as in Tysiąc v Poland)90
where abortion that is de jure available under the Medical Indications model is not in 
practice available. They can also be claimed in relation to the Prohibition model
where travel abroad creates stress and means that the abortion is later than it need 
have been; claims would also be expected to relate to lack of abortion after care and to 
women’s lack of access to tests or medical treatment for life-threatening conditions 
where the foetus might be put at risk – matters associated with both the Medical 
Indications model and Prohibition model. Such claims are considered in Chapter 5. If 
Strasbourg accepts that such claims are able to lead to findings of rights’ violations 
that would reflect the dominant position in Europe which is to permit abortion on 
request, with counselling, or on social grounds in the early stages of pregnancy. It is 
not however suggested that the ECHR is likely to be employed imminently to impose 
the Social Grounds model or Counselling model on states adhering to the more 
restrictive models; rather, it is suggested that it could be employed in order to 
alleviate certain forms of suffering caused by the regimes in place under those 
models. 
It is argued that since the last two models are strongly associated with Catholicism in 
Poland and Ireland, intervention at Strasbourg appears to be especially problematic 
due to the influence of the margin of appreciation doctrine, whereby national cultural 
and religious sensitivities are allowed to invite a restrained Strasbourg approach.91
Catholicism affects both the public and private spheres; in other words, it affects the 
individual consciences of doctors and others involved in operating abortion and 
healthcare services, as well as influencing law-makers and laws. (By ‘Catholicism’ is 
                                                
90 Tysiąc v Poland (n 44) see further chapter 3 pp 4-7.
91 See further chapter 5 pp 1-4.
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not necessarily meant the direct influence of the Catholic Church; rather, the reference 
is to cultural acceptance of Catholic morality.) Thus, it is inevitable that a gap 
between de jure and de facto abortion practice will arise – as it has done in both 
Poland and Ireland.92 The inception of the Grand Chamber at Strasbourg appears to be 
associated with a decline in the significance of the margin of appreciation doctrine in 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence.93 Thus, while seeking to bring about change in Poland 
and Ireland in reliance on the ECHR, the subject of Chapter 5, is especially complex 
and sensitive in relation to abortion services, the likelihood of so doing is greater at 
the present time than it would have been previously. Strasbourg, in other words, may 
have a greater appetite for attempted intervention in this context than previously; 
clearly, the reception of such intervention in the states in question is likely to remain 
problematic, a matter that is touched on in Chapter 6.  
                                                
92 With implications for the Strasbourg jurisprudence on abortion: see further chapters 3 pp 4-7 and 5 
pp 9-11.
93 As chapter 5 will argue (p 5) there are signs in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence that the 
influence of that doctrine is diminishing, a change that appears to be associated with the work of the
Grand Chamber; an example of this is the judgment of the Grand Chamber in A and others v UK (App 
no 3455/05) (2009) 49 EHRR 29. 
1Chapter 3 : The current Strasbourg approach to abortion services 
and a foetal right to life
This Chapter will consider the Convention rights found by the European Court of 
Human Rights to be relevant to access to abortion and associated healthcare services. 
Various potential Convention claims are discussed in Chapter 5, but the Court has so 
far only conducted detailed consideration of claims of rights-violation raised by issues 
relating to access to abortion under Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 2 
(right to life) of the Convention. The cases are, where appropriate, presented in 
chronological order to demonstrate the way that Strasbourg has developed the 
jurisprudence. The Strasbourg Court has not yet decided any case that 
straightforwardly recognises that access to abortion is required or prohibited by any 
Article of the Convention, but Poland has recently been required to recognise the 
rights of its female citizens in relation to existing, formal provision of access to 
abortion under Article 8 in Tysiąc v Poland.1 This case will be analysed in detail to 
determine whether it amounts to a ‘breakthrough case’ for further development under 
the Convention of rights to the provision of abortion services, a matter that is fully 
analysed in Chapter 5. 
No current requirement under Article 82 of abortion provision on demand as 
under the permissive models
In the case of Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany3 the Commission accepted for 
the first time that the issue of abortion could be considered under the Convention. 
That was significant since previously the stance had been, in relation to the question 
of a possible foetal right to life, that applicants had no standing to bring the issue 
                                                
1 Tysiąc v Poland (App no 5410/03) (2007) 45 EHRR 42.
2 A8(1): ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.’ A8(2): ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society… for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
3 Brüggemann and Scheuten v The Federal Republic of Germany (Decision) (App no 6959/75) (1977) 
5 DR 103.
2before the Court.4 The Commission decided that the issue of access to abortion was 
capable of falling within the right to respect for private life under Article 8(1) of the 
Convention. The case involved two women from West Germany who were prevented 
from having an abortion due to West German law which, after a Supreme Court 
Decision,5 had been made more restrictive so that access to abortion at any time 
during pregnancy was barred unless exceptional circumstances existed.6 Brüggemann 
was single and desired to avoid the disadvantages associated with illegitimate 
motherhood, while Scheuten was divorced with two children and wished to avoid 
having another. Dismissing their claims in relation to the right to marry (Article 12) 
the Commission accepted the relevance of the right to respect for private life within 
Article 8(1) as covering the ‘development and fulfilment of personality’, which 
included ‘the possibility of establishing sexual relations’.7
However, the Commission was not prepared to go further than to find that pregnancy 
could be recognised as protected within the ambit of Article 8(1). The Commission’s 
refusal to go further relied on recognition of the interests of the foetus: the 
Commission noted that certain interests relating to the foetus are legally protected 
from conception, in particular the right to inherit;8 it also found that pregnancy did not 
necessarily ‘pertain uniquely to the sphere of private life’9 because ‘whenever a 
woman becomes pregnant her private life becomes closely linked to that of the 
developing foetus’. Therefore it went on to find that not ‘every’ regulation of the 
termination of foetal life could be considered to be within the ambit of the Article –
indicating that this applied to the social or ‘choice’ based considerations that the 
applicants raised.10
                                                
4 In X v Norway (App no 867/60) and X v Austria (App no 7045/75) the Commission refused to 
consider the compatibility of laws regulating abortion to Article 2 in abstracto. Also see A Mowbrey 
‘Institutional Developments and recent Strasbourg Cases’ (2005) 5 HRL Rev 169 at para 76.
5 (1975) BVerfGE 39, 1.
6 Law of Feb 12 1976 [1976] BGB1 I 1213 (W Ger). 
7 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 3) at para 55.
8 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 3) at para 60 referring to laws in signatory states 
recognising foetal interests, in particular inheritance and A6(5) of the United Nations Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights which prohibits the execution of death sentences on pregnant women.
9 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 3) at paras 59-60.
10 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 3) at para 56.
3Prohibition/restriction of abortion not required to protect a foetal right to life 
under Article 211
In cases subsequent to Brüggemann concerning the matter of potential foetal rights, 
Strasbourg adopted a similarly evasive stance, but one which appeared to exclude the 
possibility of foetal rights under the ECHR and to down-play the significance of 
foetal interests in early pregnancy. Since Article 2 is not materially qualified and 
contains no exception for abortion, the matter is essentially one of the interpretation of 
the wording of Article 2(1) – ‘[e]veryone’s right to life must be protected by law’. 
Assuming that, as contemplated in Brüggemann, access to abortion in certain 
circumstances could be found to fall within the ambit of Article 8(1), interference 
would be justified by reference to a right to life12 of the foetus within Article 2, if the 
foetus was found to be a living being in Article 2 terms. But in Paton v United 
Kingdom13 the Commission did not accept that interpretation. The case concerned a 
complaint regarding a woman who had been allowed to have an abortion on health 
grounds in relation to a foetus of 10 weeks gestation. The Commission decided that 
the Convention Articles, including Article 2, were not to be construed in such a way 
as to contemplate their direct application to the unborn, and that the use of the term 
‘everyone’ (within a number of the Articles of the Convention) was generally to be 
considered not to include the foetus, although this interpretation could not be entirely 
excluded.14 This could arguably amount to a finding that the foetus is not therefore a 
‘person’ under the Convention which would entail, under the natural and ordinary 
meaning of Article 2, that the foetus could not be viewed as protected by its 
provisions.15
However, the Commission went on to consider whether the foetus could nevertheless 
be viewed as a form of ‘life’ – impliedly with a lesser status than that of a person –
                                                
11 A2(1) reads: ‘Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for 
which this penalty is provided by law.’
12 The Court or Commission have not so far considered that the foetus can benefit from the protection 
of any other right of the Convention: in H v Norway 73 dr 155 (1992) the Commission dismissed for 
lack of evidence the argument that the foetus suffers Article 3 treatment when it is aborted.
13 Paton v United Kingdom (App no 8416/78) (1981) 3 EHRR 408.
14 Paton v United Kingdom (n 13) at paras 7-9.
15 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 3) Dissenting Opinion of Mr JES Fawcett. See further 
chapter 6 pp 4-5. 
4within the meaning of Article 2.16 It found, without deciding the matter, that while the 
foetus could not be seen as ‘life’ requiring absolute protection, a possible
interpretation of Article 2 was that the foetus could be afforded some protection, 
subject to an implied limitation to the effect that the life and health of the woman 
would be paramount in early pregnancy.17 This evasive approach – based on  leaving 
open the question of a degree of recognition of foetal interests under Article 2 – was 
continued after Paton in H v Norway,18 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v 
Ireland,19 Boso v Italy20 and Vo v France.21
Vo v France was, however, highly significant since the Court took the stance taken in 
Paton but in respect of a potentially viable foetus.22 Vo did not concern an abortion at 
the behest of the woman, as in Paton, but an abortion performed due to medical 
negligence where Mrs Vo desired to carry the pregnancy to term.23 Vo claimed at 
Strasbourg that the foetus should receive similar protection in terms of criminal 
sanctions as could have been available in France in respect of the medically negligent 
killing of a baby. The Court declined to accept the applicant’s argument that the 
failure of the domestic authorities to classify the termination as unintentional 
homicide carrying a criminal penalty had afforded inadequate protection to the life of 
the foetus, amounting to a breach of Article 2.24 The Court took the approach set out 
above in Paton, but justified it by reference to the importance of maintaining the 
established balance in abortion regulation, referring to the generally liberal approach 
in Europe, which, it found, would be disturbed by a finding that the foetus (even at the 
stage of viability) was absolutely protected.25  
                                                
16 Paton v United Kingdom (n 13) at paras 10-23.
17 Paton v United Kingdom (n 13) at para 19. See further S Pattinson Medical Law and Ethics (2nd edn, 
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20 Boso v Italy (App no 50490/99), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-VII.
21 Vo v France (App no 53924/00) (2004) 40 EHRR 12.
22 In Vo v France (n 21) the foetus was of 20-21 weeks gestation.
23 Vo v France (n 21) at para 9 et seq.
24 Vo v France (n 21) at para 81.
25 Vo v France (n 21) at para 82. 
5The case of Tysiąc v Poland
In the case of Tysiąc v Poland26 the applicant had suffered from severely impaired 
eyesight and on finding out that she was pregnant, having had a history of difficult 
pregnancies requiring Caesareans, consulted her doctors on the medical implications 
of the pregnancy. She was seen by three ophthalmologists who determined that while 
the pregnancy posed a risk to her eyesight, they would not certify that an abortion was 
needed on therapeutic grounds as it was not certain that her retina would detach (thus 
causing effective blindness). Subsequently she sought further advice and her GP 
found that there were grounds for an abortion, taking into account the risk of 
rupturing the uterus as well as pathological changes to the retina; on this basis the GP 
issued a certificate which was taken by Tysiąc to permit her to receive a legal 
abortion. Over the second month of her pregnancy her eyesight deteriorated and she 
sought to terminate the pregnancy; however, a gynaecologist at a state hospital 
determined, after a cursory examination, that there was no significant risk to her 
health and signed a certificate to that effect, which was co-signed by an 
endocrinologist without examining her personally. The eventual result was that Tysiąc 
delivered the child by Caesarean and suffered a significant deterioration in her 
eyesight so that she became near-blind. She filed a criminal complaint against the 
gynaecologist, but at trial it was found that there was no causal link between his 
clinical assessment and the damage to her sight suffered by Tsyiac, considering the 
evidence of the three ophthalmologists and an independent panel of medical experts. 
No leave for appeal was given. Disciplinary proceedings against the endocrinologist 
also failed.
Tysiąc complained at Strasbourg that the refusal of access to abortion represented a 
direct breach of Article 8, as in effect failing to permit abortion, an argument which 
the Court refused to consider. She further claimed that there had been a breach of the 
state’s positive obligations under Article 8 to secure her physical and mental integrity 
in relation to medical services. The Court accepted that there had been an unjustified 
interference with Tysiąc’s Article 8 right to respect for her private life, placing 
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6considerable emphasis on the general context of criminal prohibition of abortion in 
Poland, and referring to the submission of the Polish Federation for Women which 
suggested that it created a ‘deterrent effect’.27 Reference was also made to the 
findings of the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
which had found deficiencies in the way that the Polish legislation was applied in 
practice.28 The Court concluded that the state was under a particular duty to provide 
an effective review procedure,29 referring particularly to the disagreements between 
the medical practitioners.30 The Court suggested that such a review procedure should 
be: fair and impartial; should give a woman an opportunity to be heard in person, and 
to have her views considered; it should be timely in order to be capable of preventing 
a deterioration of the woman’s health due to a late abortion.31
Taking these factors into account in relation to the facts, the Court found, despite 
noting that it was not its place to second-guess medical opinion, that Tysiąc’s fears for 
her health ‘could not be said to be irrational’.32 In light of this, and the 
aforementioned sensitive context, the procedure for approving abortions was found to 
be deficient, in particular due to the absence of any procedure by which the applicant 
could obtain review of the decision reached by the doctors as to her suitability for an 
abortion. The Court concluded: 
...that it has not been demonstrated that Polish law as applied to the 
applicant's case contained any effective mechanisms capable of 
determining whether the conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion 
had been met in her case. It created for the applicant a situation of 
prolonged uncertainty. As a result, the applicant suffered severe 
distress and anguish when contemplating the possible negative 
consequences of her pregnancy and upcoming delivery for her 
health.33
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29 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) para 118.
30 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) para 118.
31 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) para 119-20.
32 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) para 121.
33 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) para 126.
7The Court was careful to maintain distinctions between abortion rights founded on a 
right to choose, or on the ground of personal fulfilment, as in Brüggemann,34 or on 
preserving the physical integrity of a patient, giving some endorsement only to the 
latter position. It did so only in the sense that it found that where a state had made it 
clear that a particular medical procedure was available, access to it should be 
effective. Thus the Court took the stance that where the state has provided for a 
degree of access to abortion to be available in law, the state’s margin of appreciation 
does not extend to the manner in which it is made available. Abortion was not viewed 
by the Court – although this stance was open to it – to be a special type of medical 
procedure to be treated cautiously by the Convention in the light of domestic attitudes 
towards the protection of foetal interests. The Court did appear impliedly to accord 
access to abortion a higher status, as opposed to other offered medical procedures. 
The case was determined only on the issue of the ambit of Article 8(1), presumably 
because Poland did not consider, after Paton35 and Vo,36 that any sufficiently weighty 
interest could succeed, on proportionality and necessity grounds, under para 2.  
Therefore Poland did not put forward an argument based on Article 8(2). 
The Court’s stance in Tysiąc on the question of when an applicant’s Article 8 rights 
might be found to be infringed by denial of access to abortion is subject to at least two 
interpretations which will be briefly explored. Firstly, and most straightforwardly, the 
infringement appeared to stem from the value placed on ensuring an effective respect 
for physical integrity. Importantly, the Court placed great emphasis on the fact that 
the Polish regime purported to grant the pregnant woman some protection, which in 
Tysiąc’s case had been undermined due to medical obstructiveness linked to the 
influence of the Catholic Church. On that view, it was because Poland had given up 
its discretion in the area of abortion by creating certain legal rights of access that the 
Article 8 claim succeeded due to the refusal of an abortion which appeared to be 
permitted as falling within an accepted exception.37 It is therefore arguable that the 
Court was only prepared to find that an abortion that was potentially legal should be 
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8in practice possible. This approach arguably accords with the explicit statement of the 
Court that the case did not concern the issue of whether there was a right to abortion 
under the Convention.38
But alternatively, despite this explicit disavowal, it is possible to argue that there is a 
further dimension to the Court’s decision which comes closer on its facts to providing 
some support for such a right. This argument has two main strands: the first is that the 
Court, having regard to the importance of ‘physical integrity’,39 to the context of 
criminal liability for performing abortion, the tendency for women who were entitled 
to an abortion within the exceptions to fail to receive one, and the sensitivity of the 
issue, applied a particularly stringent requirement of procedural good practice. This 
interpretation coheres with the facts of the decision in Tysiąc – it is difficult to see 
how the procedures could have been improved in Tysiąc so as to avoid the eventuality 
of the applicant’s loss of eyesight, or even in order to provide her with compensation, 
given the opinion of the medical experts involved. The outcome meant that Poland 
would only have been able to satisfy the demands of Article 8 by offering a more 
ready access to abortion in analogous circumstances. In other words, it would have 
had to broaden the access, rather than merely coming under a duty to ensure that 
effective procedures were available to determine whether access should be granted. 
The Court appears to suggest, as Priaulx has argued, that as therapeutic abortion 
involves particularly fundamental interests, the Court may justifiably alter the balance 
between the interests of women in seeking such abortions and the interests of the 
foetus.40
The second, much more contentious, strand of argument finds that the Court was not 
concerned with procedural good practice at all and was instead creating a right of 
access to abortion under Article 8 by stealth. The latter argument is put forward by 
Jacob Cornides in attacking the undeclared pro-choice agenda of European 
institutions; he claims that they are using human rights arguments merely as a front to 
further that agenda.41 Cornides’ argument, however, fails to convince since it fails to 
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9explain fully the Court’s outright rejection of Tysiąc’s claim of a direct breach of 
Article 8 by the denial of a therapeutic abortion.42   
It is arguable that the Court could merely have found no breach of Article 8 on the 
basis that since medical opinion gave little support to Tysiąc’s case as falling within 
the legislative exception, there had been no interference with her Article 8(1) right. 
Adoption of that course would have been in accordance with its previously evasive 
and ambivalent stance on this matter. Its refusal to take that stance, which appeared to 
be open to it on the facts, indicates, it is argued, that the Court was prepared to accept 
that where a right of access to abortion appeared to be available, the state would find it 
difficult to discharge the burden of proving that there was a basis for refusing such 
access in any particular instance, if the risk in question had materialised. The 
distinction appears to create a narrowing between that stance and that of determining 
that a right of access to abortion in similar circumstances should be made available to 
satisfy Article 8. However, Tysiąc provided scope for the Court to concentrate on the 
procedural aspects of the state’s regime; the case did not confront the Court with the 
more difficult question of accepting a right of such access where the woman’s case did 
not appear to fall fairly clearly within an exception recognised by the state; therefore 
the ‘weaker’ version of the two strands of argument appears to capture the stance 
taken more readily. 
It is concluded then that Tysiąc supports the proposition that states which purport to 
provide access to abortion in certain circumstances have an Article 8 duty to ensure 
that it is available in practice in such circumstances, despite the reluctance of doctors 
to take decisions that might lead to endangering the life of the foetus.  That in itself is 
quite a contentious finding. The determination of the Court that the margin of 
appreciation doctrine does not extend to the means by which abortion that is 
theoretically available is made available in practice, implies that the Court is not 
prepared to accept that Catholic morality can be a driving force in the decisions of 
doctors if accepting that it can be leads to general reluctance to perform abortions. 
Thus, Tysiąc shows a preparedness to intervene even in the context of private religious 
sensibilities. But the decision could also arguably support the proposition that the de 
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jure circumstances in which abortion is made available should be widened or clarified 
to satisfy Article 8, while remaining within the model already accepted by the state in 
question. Poland’s response to Tysiąc, discussed in Chapter 2, of setting up a medical 
Ombudsman to give permission for abortions, took, it is argued, the most ungenerous 
stance possible towards the decision since it largely failed to address the central 
complaint that doctors were refusing to make diagnoses that might lead a woman to 
seek an abortion, on admitted or unadmitted grounds of conscience. If the 
Ombudsman upheld a complaint in the circumstances applicable in Tysiąc, but a new 
diagnosis by the medical expert in question agreed with the first one, a woman in the 
position Tysiąc was in would not be able to gain access to an abortion. The diagnosis 
might demand too high a level of certainty as to the likelihood of the risk in question 
(in Tysiąc’s case of damage to her eyesight) materialising. The Ombudsman remedy 
would not address that problem and so would not appear to be adequate to address the 
demands of Article 8 as laid down at Strasbourg.
Ancillary rights to abortion services – access to information and debate on 
abortion
The Court has also had regard to the matter of abortion services in various cases, not 
directly turning on the availability of abortion to the applicant, but on the availability 
of other services related to abortion provision – the ability to receive information in 
relation to abortion. In Open Door Counselling v Ireland43 freedom of expression in 
relation to abortion services under Article 10 overcame the potentially legitimate 
concerns of the state in protecting unborn life. An injunction had prevented the 
claimant, an abortion counselling service, from informing Irish people of the identity 
or location of abortion services abroad, or of methods of communicating with such 
services. While the Court avoided deciding on the issue of abortion explicitly, it did 
allude to the fact that the injunction created a risk to health since it could create delays 
in obtaining legal abortions; further, the Court found that it had a greater impact on 
impecunious women in terms of leading to delay.44 The Court deliberately left open 
the possibility that Article 2 interests might be capable of placing some restrictions on 
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information on abortion, but clearly accepted the significance of the provision of such 
information.45
The Court recently defended expression in relation to reproductive rights in Portugal 
(before the more permissive regime was introduced) in Women on the Waves and 
Others v Portugal.46 Dutch and Portuguese family planning organisations had aimed
to spark debate on the matter of abortion in Portugal; a ship was commissioned which 
would travel to Portugal where people would then be able to debate decriminalisation 
and learn about family planning on board during various events. The Portuguese 
government responded by banning the ship from entering its waters (by Ministerial 
Decree) on the basis that it planned to distribute prohibited pharmaceuticals; in order 
to carry this ban into effect a warship was dispatched to meet the ship. The Strasbourg 
Court, noting that there was no evidence for the government’s assertion, characterised 
the government’s interests as related to ‘public order or health’, which could not 
justify the severe chilling of the free speech of the family planning organisations that 
such an extreme measure had created.  
Conclusions as to the Court’s stance 
The current approach of the Strasbourg Court to abortion cases cannot be predicted 
with certainty until and if a clearer stance is taken in relation to the right to life of the 
foetus. If that occurred the gulf in reasoning in Tysiąc v Poland47 as to the relationship 
between foetal interests and the question of abortion would be filled,48 which in 
particular would indicate whether the Court had clearly accepted an implied limitation
to a concept of a foetal right to life based on the health of the mother, as had been 
suggested in Paton v United Kingdom.49 In Tysiąc the argument centred on the ambit 
of Article 8(1); while the argument as to a competing ‘right of others’ was not put 
forward, the state appeared instead to be seeking to establish a restricted ambit for 
Article 8(1) in this context which would have placed rights of access to abortion 
                                                
45 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 19).
46 Women on Waves and Others v Portugal (App no 31276/05), judgment of 3rd February 2009.
47 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1).
48 N Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 37) at 370: referring to the missing link between 
Tysiąc and previous abortion cases.
49 Paton v United Kingdom (n 13) at para 19.
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outside it. Thus the difficult issue of the status of the foetus in relation to the 
protection of the ‘rights of others’ was not addressed. 
It is clear that the decision in Tysiąc is significant since for the first time regulation 
that touched on the central abortion issue (that of availability) was found to be 
incompatible with Article 8. This reflects the approach of the Court in relation to 
ancillary abortion rights in which the discretion of the state to treat the foetus as a 
living being is arguably given very little weight (in Women on the Waves and Open 
Door). This may be contrasted with the approach in D v Ireland (admissibility),50
decided before Tysiąc, in which the Commission emphasised that the matter of 
balancing such ‘constitutionally enshrined’ rights as those of the mother and foetus 
was one with which it would be reluctant to interfere. As was argued above, although 
in Tysiąc the Court sought to confine its judgment to procedural matters, the 
indications were that the Court had decided to form its own judgment on this 
extremely sensitive matter, given the suffering undergone by Tysiąc. Clearly, 
however, the procedural aspects of Tysiąc obscured the substantive issue: had Poland 
provided no possibility of abortion even where the woman’s health would be placed at 
serious risk due to continuance of the pregnancy, the Court would have had to 
confront the substantive issue head-on. 
Given that certain countries, on religious grounds, are now so out of line with the rest 
of Europe on this issue, and given the inescapable indications that denial of access to 
reproductive or general health services for women due to the influence of religious 
leaders is hard, if not impossible, to reconcile with the aspiration of the ECHR to 
respect and promote sexual equality,51 this highly significant decision is arguably 
likely to be the forerunner of future ones making further forays into this contentious 
area of social policy. The stance at Strasbourg in relation to reliance on the margin of 
appreciation doctrine on this issue supports the notion of an emergent recognition of 
rights of access to abortion services since Strasbourg has declined to decide that the 
foetus falls within Article 2, but has decided – at least on procedural grounds – that 
access to abortion falls within Article 8. So in effect the discretion of a state under the 
                                                
50 D v Ireland (Admissibility) (App no 26499) (2006) 43 EHRR SE 16 dismissed as inadmissible for 
failure to exhaust domestic remedies. See chapter 5 p 6.
51 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Arts 1-2.
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ECHR to treat the foetus as a living being of equal status (or of equal status except 
where the mother’s life is at risk) to the mother is diminishing. 
1Chapter 4 : International human rights law and access to abortion 
services
This chapter will outline the developments under international human rights 
jurisprudence that could provide both impetus for further recognition of rights to 
abortion services at Strasbourg1 and a model for the form those rights could take in 
the European system under the ECHR. The international human rights context will be 
briefly set out to demonstrate that there is currently a trend towards recognition that 
access to abortion and to full healthcare services for women – even where they are 
pregnant and the foetus could be placed at risk – are human rights issues. This chapter 
will focus in particular on the developments under certain key instruments: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), monitored by the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC); further reference will be made to the Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
monitored by the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW Committee), and to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) monitored by the Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The ICCPR is of particular 
significance since its provisions are closest in form to the rights in the ECHR. The 
rights of the mother will be discussed separately from consideration of possible 
recognition of a right to life of the foetus in order to reflect the distinct approach 
adopted towards the two issues.
These treaties are particularly pertinent as they are well established; their provisions 
(discussed below) touch on the provision of abortion services and they contribute to a 
European consensus on human rights (all major European countries have signed and 
ratified these treaties). They are also ‘quasi-legal’ in that they use an enforcement 
mechanism of reports and recommendation by committee and thus have a 
                                                
1 It is well established that international treaties affect the development of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence: see eg J Merrills The development of international law by the European Court of Human 
Rights (Man UP 1993) at 218 et seq; another example is presented by the case of DH and others v 
Czech Republic (App no 57325/00) (2008) 47 EHRR 3 in which race was recognised as a category 
demanding heightened protection from discrimination (reference was made to the Framework 
Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the EU Race Equality Directive).
2considerable persuasive authority for the Strasbourg Court. Finally, all have been 
cited by the Court already in its jurisprudence.2 However, they clearly do not render 
the ECHR superfluous as not all possess a mechanism for considering individual 
cases and none are as effective as the ECHR in this regard. Therefore the Strasbourg 
Court has the further role in relation to the European signatories of these treaties of 
interpreting and, in effect, enforcing their provisions in so far as it allows them to 
influence its determinations as to the ECHR; furthermore, as a regional human rights 
instrument specific to Europe the ECHR has greater relevance for European countries.
International Human Rights Context
The European Convention could and, it is argued, should join international human 
rights treaties in recognising the expansion in protection as human rights of women’s 
rights in the reproductive sphere. As early as 1968 the first conceptualisation of 
‘reproductive rights’ – the right of parents to determine freely the number and spacing 
of their children – as human rights was recognised in the Final Act of the First World 
Conference on Human Rights at Tehran.3 Since then the rights of women in relation 
to family planning services have been repeatedly recognised by international human 
rights bodies - for example, in the Programme of Action of the 1994 United Nations 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, which stressed the 
importance of the right to decide when and how to reproduce and the ‘right of access 
to appropriate health care services that will enable women to go safely through 
pregnancy and childbirth’.4 At the 1994 Conference the attending governments from 
over 180 nations expressly acknowledged, for the first time, that reproductive rights 
are grounded in already existing human rights obligations. That has led to an 
expansion in international human rights law dealing with women’s rights to abortion 
services. The most far-reaching (and arguably most progressive) of such laws is the 
African Charter (1981)5 which became the first legally binding international human 
                                                
2 See re ICCPR Tysiąc v Poland (App no 5410/03) (2007) 45 EHRR 42 at paras 50-52 re CEDAW 
Rantsez v Cyprus (App no 25965/04) (2010) 51 EHRR 1 and re ICESCR (2009) Demir v Turkey (App 
no 34503/97) (2009) 48 EHRR 54.
3 A/Conf.32/41 UN Doc.
4 Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-13 Sept 1994 
A/Conf 171/13 Rev 1 at Chapter VII 7.12.
5 OAU Doc. Cab/Leg/76/3 Rev.5; 21 ILM 58 (1982).
3rights instrument to recognise explicitly a right to therapeutic abortion in 2003 after 
adopting the African Women’s Protocol,6 which requires member states to authorise 
measures to:
…protect the reproductive rights of women by authorising medical abortion 
in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where continued pregnancy 
endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the 
mother or the foetus.7
The substance of rights in international human rights law affecting the provision 
of abortion
The right to life of the woman
The ECHR, which explicitly protects the right to life, could conceptualize this right as 
requiring the state to provide abortion services in line with the trend in international 
human rights law. The obligation to protect the woman’s life, established explicitly in 
the ICCPR,8 has been interpreted by the HRC to extend to positive obligations to 
safeguard life9 (which is similar to the position under the ECHR).10 From this position 
the HRC has recognised that extremely restrictive abortion laws, e.g. those that 
criminalise abortion without an exception for rape, are incompatible with this right 
due to the link with maternal mortality associated with high rates of clandestine 
abortion.11 In this observation the ICCPR is joined by the CEDAW Committee12 in 
                                                
6 Res. AHG/Res.240 (XXXI). 
7 Article 14.2 (c). 
8 Article 6(1) ‘every human being has the inherent right to life’. This has been recognised to extend to 
positive obligations: CCPR/C/21.rev. 1 at para 5, 19 May 1989.
9 CCPR/C/21.rev. 1 at para 5, 19 May 1989.
10 LCB v United Kingdom (App no 23413/94) (1998) 27 EHRR 212 and chapter 5 pp 17-19.
11 See eg in regard to Poland: 29 July 1999 CCPR/C/79/Add.110 at para 11 and Peru: Nov 2000 
CCPR/CO/70/PER at para 20. Furthermore by the HRC explicitly recognised the relevance of the right 
to life to the provision of abortion services by stating that when contracting parties report on the right 
to life they should ‘give information on any measures taken by the state to… ensure that [women] do 
not have to undergo life-threatening clandestine abortions’ Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 7 (2004) HRC, 
General Comment No. 28L: Article 3. 
4relation to the right of non-discrimination in access to healthcare during pregnancy 
and by the CESCR as an aspect of the right to healthcare,13 recently restated in 
relation to Poland.14 The CEDAW Committee has further found a potential breach of 
women’s right to life due to punitive provisions creating a ‘chilling effect’, indirectly 
preventing women from seeking medical treatment in cases of abortion conducted 
illegally or outside the provisions of the state in question. In this regard it has urged 
state parties to ensure access to post-abortion care to reduce maternal mortality.15 The 
CEDAW Committee has further found that fundamental reproductive health is 
essential to women’s equality and thus ‘it is discriminatory for a State Party to refuse 
to provide legally for the performance of certain reproductive health services for 
women’.16 There is therefore a high degree of consensus that the right to life requires 
access to abortion services where the life of the woman is endangered by the 
continuation of a pregnancy. The intersection between freedom from discrimination 
and the right to life where the state withholds or criminalises basic reproductive health 
services in instances that threaten the woman’s life is revealing since both rights are 
protected under the ECHR. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the ECtHR has arguably already recognised that an 
abortion regime may violate rights under the Convention, if in practice extremely 
restrictive as under the Medical Indications model17 operative in Poland. Further 
impetus to create such recognition in relation to protection of the right to life is 
provided by the HRC which has noted that the restrictive regime in Poland ‘incites 
women to seek unsafe, illegal abortion, with attendant risks to life and health’.18 In 
considering the Polish regime the HRC noted that though abortion was de jure 
                                                                                                                                           
12 CEDAW Article 12(1) enjoins state parties to ‘eliminate discrimination against women in the field 
of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care 
services, including those related to family planning’ see also General Recommendation No 24 in 
Compilation of General Comments (n 11) at 280 para 27 and Concluding observations of CEDAW 
regarding Lithuania 16 June 2000 A/55/38 at para 158.
13 ICESCR Article 12(1): ‘State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ as interpreted by the 
CESCR: Poland , 16 June 1998 E/C.12/1/Add.26 at para 12.
14 E/C.12/1/Add.82 at para 29.
15 See eg Brazil, 29-30, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BRA/6 (2007); Chile, 20, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (2006).
16 General Recommendation No 24 in Compilation of General Comments (n 11) at 276 para 11. 
17 See chapter 2 pp 6-8.
18 ICCPR Poland 1999 (n 11) at para 11.
5available in certain circumstances (as described in Chapter 2),19 the attitude of doctors 
in conjunction with the criminal regime, and the prevalence of conscientious 
objection, created a regime that was in practice extremely restrictive.20
The right to health 
The ECHR does not recognise a general right to health; therefore the right to health 
recognised by CEDAW21 and the ICESCR22 as requiring access to therapeutic 
abortion services23 can only be recognised partially by the Court where the Articles of 
the Convention touch on healthcare services, a matter returned to in Chapter 5. Both 
CEDAW and the CESCR recognise that denial of abortion services has an adverse 
impact on equal access to healthcare regardless of gender, and this issue has also 
received recognition from commentators;24 this approach could be conceptualised 
under the ECHR as a breach of Article 14,25 coupled with another Article (most 
obviously Articles 8 or 3 as they relate to physical and mental integrity). The 
CEDAW Committee has recognised that punitive provisions and reporting 
requirements that prevent women from seeking medical treatment where abortion is 
conducted illegally or outside the state in question violate the right to health.26 The 
CEDAW Committee has applied this in relation to Ireland, stating in its Concluding 
Recommendation in 1999 that it was concerned in the light of the right to health that 
‘with very limited exceptions, abortion remained illegal in Ireland’, forcing women 
                                                
19 At pp 6-7.
20 ICCPR Poland 1999 (n 11) at para 11.
21 Article 12(1).
22 Article 12(1) sets out the right to ‘enjoyment of the highest possible standards of physical and 
mental health’ and Article 3 sets out the right of equality in enjoying the rights set out in the other 
Articles; these provisions have been interpreted to require recognition of women’s reproductive health 
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of 
Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 3) 34th Session 
2005) U.N. Doc E/C.12/2005/4.
23 For example, of high rates of abortion – see concluding observations of CEDAW regarding the 
Czech Republic 14 May 1998 A/53/38 at para 197.
24 See eg R Sifris ‘Restrictive Regulation of abortion and the right to health’ (2010) 18 Med L Rev
185, 207 commenting on the special relationship between gender equality and reproductive health. See 
further chapter 6 pp 3-4.
25 Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of any right protected by the Convention. See 
Chapter 5 pp 19-23.
26 See eg Brazil, 29-30, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BRA/6 (2007); Chile, 20, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (2006).
6seeking an abortion to travel abroad.27 It further found that this situation created 
hardship for vulnerable groups, such as female asylum seekers, who cannot leave the 
territory of the State. The Committee subsequently reiterated this point in 2005.28
The CEDAW Committee29 and CESCR30 have interpreted the right to health as  
requiring effective access to abortion to avert risks to health (even where no risk to 
life arises), as discussed above in relation to the right to life. In relation to Poland the 
CESCR has recommended that access to abortion services where already legal on 
health grounds should not be hindered by the reluctance of the medical establishment 
to provide such services.31 In that regard it requires that the medical profession is fully 
informed about the scope of Polish law and that information on the implementation of 
legislation to enhance the availability of abortion is made available in the next 
report.32 These conclusions bear similarity to the position of the ECtHR in Tysiąc v 
Poland;33 Amnesty also raised the matter of the judgment in its submission to the 
Committee:34 there is therefore a strong argument that Article 8 as interpreted by the 
ECtHR in Tysiąc v Poland can be conceived of as protecting women’s right to health 
in this context.
The ICCPR provides a model of partial recognition of the right to reproductive health 
care in terms of various civil rights, which the ECHR could adopt. The HRC 
interpreted the application of various guarantees, including the right to life (see 
above), freedom from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 7), privacy 
(Article 17) and the rights of children (Article 24), to cover the health of the woman 
in relation to therapeutic abortion in the case of KL v Peru (2005).35 KL was in effect 
forced to undergo an anencephalic pregnancy which caused her severe emotional 
                                                
27 Ireland. 25/06/99 A/54/38,paras.161-201.
28 Thirty-third session 5-22 July 2005 at para 38.
29 See e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, 36, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/COD/CO/5 (2006).
30Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men 
and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 3) 34th Session 2005) 
U.N. Doc E/C.12/2005/4.
31 Concluding Observations of the CESCR regarding Poland 6 Nov 2009 E/C.12/Co/5 at para 28.
32 Concluding Observations of the CESCR regarding Poland 6 Nov 2009 E/C.12/Co/5 at para 28.
33 Tysiąc v Poland (App no 5410/03) (2007) 45 EHRR 42; see further Chapter 3 pp 4-7. 
34 Amnesty International Oct 2009 EUR 37/002/2009 see at <http://www.amnesty.org> accessed 
29.09.10. 
35 KL v Peru (1153/2003), CC{R/DC/85/D/1153/2003 (2005); 13 IHRR (2006). 
7trauma due to being denied an abortion by reason of foetal impairment in Peru. Peru’s 
exception to its criminal prohibition of abortion explicitly covers health,36 but the 
state hospitals were not prepared to accept that her situation satisfied the narrow legal 
exception in Peruvian law allowing abortion to protect the health or life of the 
mother.37 In this respect the facts of KL bear similarity to those the ECtHR was faced 
with in D v Ireland (admissibility) discussed further in Chapter 5.38
The HRC’s most far-reaching finding in KL was that a failure to provide a therapeutic 
abortion caused KL suffering which constituted inhuman and degrading treatment 
(Article 7),39 thus indicating that provision of abortion to avert a threat to a woman’s 
physical or mental health in similar circumstances is required since the Article, 
paralleling Article 3 ECHR, is not qualified.40 (An HRC Concluding Observation to 
Ireland in 2000 before KL linked the issue of forcing women to undergo pregnancies 
due to restrictive laws with the obligations under Article 7.)41 A violation of KL’s 
privacy (Article 17) was found on the basis that KL was legally entitled to an abortion 
and therefore the refusal to grant her an abortion was not justified within that article. 
The finding that there was an unlawful denial of access to an abortion was based on 
the World Health Organisation’s interpretation of ‘health’, referred to in the Peruvian 
law, which includes mental health. While the application of Article 17 could arguably 
be found not to relate directly to health, this decision demonstrates that the Article 
protects patient autonomy, with far-reaching implications in relation to abortion, since 
it demanded a widening of the Peruvian exception to include mental health. As 
regards Article 24, a violation was found on the basis that the state had failed to 
address KL’s special status as a female minor, due to the barriers that were created to 
her ability to access a legal abortion, tending to expose adolescent girls in particular to 
rights’ violations. A breach of Article 2 was found due to the lack of procedural 
mechanisms to prevent or address the violations. 
                                                
36 Health Code of 18 March 1969 arts 19-23. Legislation cited by International Federation of 
Professional Abortion FIAPAC ‘Abortion Law of Each Nation State’ available at 
<http://www.fiapac.org>. 
37 KL v Peru (n 35) at paras 2.4 and 2.5.
38 D v Ireland (Admissibility) (App no 26499) (2006) 43 EHRR SE 16 see Ch 5 text to note 68.
39 KL v Peru (n 35) at para 6.3.
40 JM Gher and C Zampas ‘Abortion as a Human Right: International and Regional Standards’ (2008) 
8 HRLR 249, 270.
41 29 March 2000 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 at para 24.
8The recognition by the CESCR and CEDAW Committee that the right to health 
requires that the medical establishment ensures the provision of abortions where they 
are legally available accords with the approach in KL v Peru. In this respect there is 
considerable similarity in approach to that of the ECtHR in relation to the right to 
respect for private life (Article 8) in the case of Tysiąc v Poland.42 However, the HRC 
in KL v Peru in interpreting Article 7 – freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment 
– in this circumstance went further in that it recognised that even where abortion is 
not de jure available it should be provided as part of a substantive positive obligation 
to provide protection from inhuman and degrading treatment. This argument was 
raised in Tysiąc under Article 3 ECHR but was not considered by the Court.43  
The right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment
This right is explicitly recognised by the ECHR under Article 3; thus the ECtHR 
could interpret this Article to require the state to prevent the humiliation and 
degradation of women where abortion services are denied in certain circumstances 
such as those of rape or fatal foetal disability. This would accord with the 
interpretation of the equivalent Article of the ICCPR (Article 7).44 The HRC has 
registered concern at Ireland’s prohibition on abortion which applies where the 
pregnancy was a result of rape.45 In KL v Peru, as indicated,46 the HRC gave detailed 
consideration to the issue of humiliation where a woman is forced to undergo a 
pregnancy in which the foetus is fatally disabled, as in an anencephalic pregnancy, 
coming to the conclusion that this may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
The recognition by both CEDAW47 and the ICESCR48 that a lack of an exception to a 
                                                
42 Tysiąc v Poland (n 2). See chapter 3 pp 4-7.
43 Tysiąc v Poland (n 2) at para 64-8.
44 Concluding Observations of the HRC regarding Peru 15 November 2000 CCPR/CO/70/PER. The 
HRC has confirmed that abortion is relevant to Article 7 by General Comment No. 28 which states that 
full compliance with the Article requires that states report on whether they provide access to legal 
abortion for women pregnant due to rape: Compilation of General Comments (n 11) General Comment 
28 at para 11.
45 Concluding Observations of the HRC regarding Ireland: 24 July 2000 A/55/40 at para 23 and 30 
July 2008 CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3 at para 13.
46 KL v Peru (n 35) at para 6.3 see above p 5.
47 Concluding Observations of CEDAW regarding Jordan, 27 January 2000 A/55/38 at para 246. It has 
encouraged the reintroduction of ‘legislation to permit termination of pregnancy in cases of rape, incest 
9prohibition on abortion for rape or fatal foetal abnormality breaches the right to health 
adds further weight to this interpretation of inhuman and degrading treatment, in 
particular where abortion is criminalised in these circumstances.49 There has been 
recognition that impediments to access to abortion where it is legal in these 
circumstances breaches this right by the HRC,50 and the right to health by the CESCR. 
The CESCR has identified various impermissible impediments to abortion services 
where legal in these circumstances, such as ‘misinformation, lack of clear guidelines, 
abusive behaviour directed at rape victims by public prosecutors and health 
personnel’.51
Rights to ‘privacy’, autonomy (including reproductive self-determination), dignity
The ICCPR protects by Article 9(1) the right to ‘liberty and security of the person’; 
this right has been interpreted in national jurisdictions such as Canada52 to prevent 
excessive state interference with reproductive choices. However, neither the ICCPR 
nor CEDAW at present recognise explicitly that a women’s choice to terminate her 
pregnancy could be viewed as an aspect of her right to control over her liberty. Nor 
have their provisions been interpreted to require such recognition. That accords with 
the approach under the ECHR which, while recognising the potential relevance of 
sexual autonomy as part of the right to respect for private life in the abortion context 
under Article 8, does not at present consider that it requires abortion on request.53
At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo the 
representatives agreed that women needed to be empowered to take charge of their 
reproductive lives, and that unsafe abortion is a public health concern. 
                                                                                                                                           
and congenital abnormality of the foetus’ in relation to one state party: Sri Lanka, 283, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/38, Part I (2002). 
48 See eg Concluding Observations of CESCR regarding Malta 14 December 2004 E/C.12/Add. 101 at 
para 41.
49 Concluding Observations of CEDAW regarding Nepal, 25 June 1999 25/06/1999 CEDAW A/54/38 
at para 147.
50 KL v Peru (n 35) at para 6.3.
51 Concluding Observations of the CESCR regarding Mexico, 9 June 2006 E/C 12/Mex/Co/6 at para 
25.
52 Article 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as interpreted in R v Morgantalor (1988) 
44 DLR (4th) 385. 
53 Brüggemann and Scheuten v The Federal Republic of Germany (Decision) (App no 6959/75) (1977) 
5 DR 103 at para 55. See chapter 3 pp 1-2.
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Following the Cairo conference, in 1995, at the World Conference on Women in 
Beijing, governments pledged to guarantee reproductive rights for all women. The 
United Nations and regional human rights bodies began to urge governments to 
respect and ensure women’s reproductive rights, based on the idea of reproductive 
self-determination. Women in Africa and those with disabilities have obtained 
recognition of a right to control their reproductive lives in two new human rights 
agreements - the 2008 UN Disability Rights Convention and the 2005 Protocol on the 
Rights of Women in Africa.
The right to life of the foetus
There are few examples in human rights law of provision of a right to life that may be 
claimed on behalf of the foetus. However, there are exceptions in national 
Constitutions, in particular in countries which follow the Roman Catholic tradition. In 
international human rights law the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first 
treaty to set out a right to life (Article 3), arguably excludes the unborn from the ambit 
of the right,54 while the majority of Treaties that set out a right to life leave the matter 
open, apart from the American Convention on Human Rights, which by Article 4 
paragraph 1 protects the right to life ‘in general, from the moment of conception’.
The right to life set out in the ICCPR does not explicitly rule out its application to the 
foetus – it applies to every ‘human being’. However, it is arguable from a historical 
analysis of the purpose of the ICCPR that this right is implicitly not intended to apply 
from conception since in the drafting of the Article such an amendment was 
rejected.55 This accords with the encouragement given by the HRC to state parties 
with restrictive abortion laws to liberalise their laws, despite the fact that these 
restrictive laws are based on protection for the foetus from conception as in Ireland.56
The French courts have upheld the permissive French abortion laws as in accordance 
                                                
54 By Article 1 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ See further Gher & Zampas ‘Abortion as a Human Right’ (n 40) at 
263-4.
55 Gher & Zampas ‘Abortion as a Human Right’ (n 40) 263-4; also see GA OR Annex, 12th Session 
(1597). Agenda Item 33 at 96, A/C.3/L.654 at para 113.
56 Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution.
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with the requirements of Article 6.57 As discussed in Chapter 3, the Strasbourg Court 
in relation to Article 2 ECHR, the interpretation of the right to life as including the 
foetus does not appear to accord with the decisions in the cases on abortion services. 
The stance taken by certain human rights bodies to availability of abortion where 
pregnancy is the result of rape, discussed above, gives supports to this stance. 
Impliedly, if states are encouraged to provide an exception to allow abortion in a case 
of rape, the state is not according a status to the life of the foetus that is equal to the 
status accorded to the life of the woman. 
Conclusion
It is clear that there is growing support for the recognition of rights to provision of 
abortion services in international human rights law. The African Charter is the only 
instrument to recognize such rights explicitly; however, interpretations of the other 
Treaties by their reporting and enforcement mechanisms have brought the provisions 
closer to providing such recognition. The most far-reaching developments have 
occurred in relation to the ‘right to health’ and rights in the healthcare context. The 
conclusion of the CESCR and HRC in this regard echoes the reasoning of the 
Strasbourg Court in Tysiąc58 to an extent, but the HRC appears to recognize that 
provision of abortion where it is not already legal is encompassed by the right to be 
free from inhuman and degrading treatment in the healthcare setting, and therefore 
goes beyond the stance of the Strasbourg Court in Tysiąc. The HRC’s stance provides 
a firm basis in international human rights law for the outcome of Tysiąc and confirms 
that the decision is one with further implications for development of rights to the 
provision of abortion services. The general trend under the Treaties discussed appears 
to be towards recognition that excessive restriction of women’s reproductive choices, 
as in Poland and Ireland, leads to various forms of suffering and detriment for women 
that should be viewed as a human rights issue. Thus there is considerable support in 
international law for development of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to recognize 
health based human rights implications of the lack of provision of abortion services, 
                                                
57 Judgement of 21 Dec 1990, 7 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 208 (1991).
58 Tysiąc v Poland (n 2) see chapter 3 pp 4-7.
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and the Court may develop an argument based on such support in the application of 
ABC v Ireland,59 as discussed in the next chapter.
Further developments could provide a model for future recognition of rights other 
than in the sphere of healthcare. The developments under the Treaties towards 
recognition that interference with women’s right to life occurs where abortion 
services are denied in certain circumstances, an issue not yet raised before the ECHR 
but which is raised before the Grand Chamber in ABC,60 could provide a model for 
the Court to recognize such rights in future. This is especially so in relation to Poland 
where concerns over high rates of maternal mortality associated with the restrictive 
abortion regime have been highlighted by various treaty monitoring bodies. CEDAW 
has emphasised, in relation to life and health (in which it is joined by the CESCR), 
and in relation to degrading treatment, that denial of abortion services can produce a 
disproportionate burden upon women that amounts to discrimination in that it denies 
women access to full healthcare provision, a point that is raised in the pending 
application at Strasbourg of Z v Poland.61 The manifest trend in international human 
rights law is therefore to emphasize the rights of the woman rather than those of the 
foetus, but no modern Treaty explicitly sets this out. The current stance of the ECtHR 
on foetal rights is therefore not anomalous in failing to determine whether the foetus 
is protected: that does not appear to pose a bar to the development of rights to 
abortion services in international human rights law. 
                                                
59 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (App no 25579/05), lodged 15 July 2005.
60 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (n 59) COMPLAINTS para 1. See chapter 5 pp 4-7.
61 Z v Poland (Statement of Facts) (App no 46132/08), lodged 16 September 2008 see chapter 5 text to 
note 83.
1Chapter 5 : The future development of rights of access to abortion 
and to full associated healthcare services for women under the ECHR
This chapter considers the potential for the development of the Convention rights at 
Strasbourg as a means of extending access to abortion and related healthcare services 
in restrictive abortion regimes. It further examines the possible role, if any, of the 
Convention in relation to denial of full healthcare services to women (for conditions 
unrelated to pregnancy) due to their reproductive function. A range of claims arising 
in relation to the restrictive abortion regimes as set out in Chapter 2, are considered, 
taking account of the current Strasbourg jurisprudence, relevant Strasbourg principles 
and the growing tendency to conceptualise these issues as breaches of human rights in 
international human rights law, discussed in Chapter 4. The discussion will also take 
full account of the implications of the case of Tysiąc v Poland1 in relation to Article 8 
of the Convention. The chapter will also consider potential arguments that the states 
in question could raise to deny claimed positive obligations in this context under 
Convention rights or, where the right in question provides for this, to justify the 
infringement. Thus, arguments in relation to the possible interaction with the ‘right to 
life’ of the foetus and the relevance of the margin of appreciation doctrine will be 
considered together.
The obligations that might potentially be found to arise under the Convention will be 
considered in particular in relation to a case that is currently before the Grand 
Chamber, ABC v Ireland,2 a case that is potentially the most significant one by far to 
arise in the abortion context at Strasbourg. The focus on the possible outcomes in that 
case is intended to demonstrate the potential applicability of such obligations to 
domestic laws that prohibit or severely restrict availability of abortion. A further 
reason for this approach is that if this case passes the admissibility stage, it would 
provide the Grand Chamber with the most significant opportunity in recent years to 
consider in detail whether rights of access to abortion and to relevant health care 
provisions are required in some circumstances by the Convention, thus potentially 
giving much greater clarity to the emergent Convention jurisprudence on this issue. 
                                                
1 Tysiąc v Poland (App no 5410/03) (2007) 45 EHRR 42.
2 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (App no 25579/05), lodged 15 July 2005.
2The margin of appreciation doctrine and a foetal ‘right to life’ under the 
Convention
Strasbourg’s analysis of potential state interference with positive obligations 
recognised under the Convention Articles,3 and the justifications for interference set 
out in paragraph 2 of Articles 8-11 of the Convention,4 can be particularly affected by 
reference to the state’s ‘margin of appreciation’.5 This term, touched on in Chapter 1, 
describes the mechanism by which Strasbourg will defer to member states on, inter 
alia, grounds of especial cultural sensitivity in relation to the protection of rights, 
although the Court has emphasised that it must still consider whether the ‘actual 
measures of “interference” they take are relevant and sufficient’.6
The Court affirmed the relevance of the state’s margin of appreciation in relation to 
the matter of the beginning of life for the purposes of Article 2 in Vo v France7 and 
Evans v United Kingdom.8 That stance implies that it may be within a state’s margin 
of appreciation to protect the foetus from conception as if it were a ‘person’ and thus 
to determine that in any balancing act between the right to life of the foetus and rights 
of the woman – aside from her right to life – the life of the foetus would prevail. If 
that stance were to be unequivocally adopted, it would seem that Strasbourg could not 
recognise forms of access to abortion and (possibly) to related services as giving rise 
to Convention obligations where claims were made against states with restrictive 
abortion regimes based on the protection of foetal life. Following that stance, 
Strasbourg would have to accept that a determination to afford such protection, 
whatever the adverse consequences for women in terms of risks to health or even life, 
was within the state’s margin of appreciation. The Court could have declined to 
decide Tysiąc v Poland on that basis, but did not, which appears inconsistent with the 
                                                
3 See eg Abdulaziz, Cabales, Balkandali v UK (A/94) (1985) 7 EHRR 741 at para 67.
4 Handyside v United Kingdom (A/24) (1976) 1 EHRR 737 paras 48-9.
5 Handyside v United Kingdom (n 4) at paras 48-9.
6 Handyside v United Kingdom (n 4) at para 50.
7 Vo v France (App no 53924/00) (2004) 40 EHRR 12 at para 82.
8 Evans v United Kingdom (App no 6339/05); (2006) 43 EHRR 21 at para 54.
3principle from Vo and Evans.9 However, as one academic commentator has noted, it is 
arguable that Poland was considered to have given up its margin of appreciation in 
relation to the provision of abortion by providing for abortion in the circumstances in 
question in law.10 If so, that would confine findings of rights’ violations to the 
procedural implementation of a particular abortion regime since that implementation 
would fall outside the margin of appreciation conceded to the state. As the European 
Centre for Law and Justice, a Christian legal centre, have argued in their written 
observations to the Court, opposing both the admissibility and substance of the 
application in ABC v Ireland, that would mean that the Court had no role in relation to 
regimes that adopt a Prohibition model, most notably Ireland.11
However, even if that interpretation of the impact of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine was accepted, it does not necessarily follow that states adopting a Prohibition 
model can avoid the Convention entirely on that basis. Ireland is intending to argue in 
ABC that unlike Poland it does not accept the legitimacy of abortion and therefore its 
decision to accord foetal life virtually equal status with the life of the mother must 
remain undisturbed since it has not over-stepped its margin of appreciation. The flaw 
in that argument is that in practice, the Irish state does oversee an abortion regime –
albeit one that is based on women travelling to England for abortions or on allowing 
abortion to save the life of the mother. The Court has already required Ireland, despite 
its explicit constitutional provision,12 to partially dismantle one aspect of the 
Prohibition model it adopts – the suppression of certain information relating to 
abortion abroad, in Open Door Counselling v Ireland.13 Although the Court did not 
consider the abortion context in that case in any depth it found it relevant to a finding 
of a violation of Article 10 that Ireland permitted travelling abroad for an abortion and 
                                                
9 The margin of appreciation is applied in this fashion by Judge Borreggo Borreggo: see Tysiąc v 
Poland (n 1) The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Borreggo Borreggo at para 8.
10 N Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation: Therapeutic Abortion, Reproductive ‘Rights’ and 
the Intriguing Case of Tysiąc v Poland’ (2008) 15 EJHL 361, 372.
11 Written Observations by the European Centre for Law and Justice Application No. 25579/05 before 
the European Convention on Human Rights Third Section: A.,B.,C. v Ireland. See at: 
<http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF08K11.pdf> accessed 29.09.10. 
12 The Court rejected the argument that Article 10 should be viewed in light of Article 2 in accordance 
with Ireland’s constitutional stance on the basis that the state’s discretion in the field of morals was not 
unlimited Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland (App no 14234/88) (1992) 15 
EHRR 44 at paras 67-69, also see R Lawson ‘The Irish Abortion Cases: European Limits to National 
Sovereignty? EJHL 1 167 at pp 177-80.
13 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 12).
4thus that Irish women were accessing services that were in a sense lawful.14 As a 
result the measures employed were viewed as disproportionate to the aim pursued 
under Article 10(2) despite being designed to uphold the Irish prohibition. Thus the 
margin of appreciation accorded to Ireland to protect foetal life was diminished. There 
is also the possibility that another aspect of the Irish prohibition – the lack of co-
ordination of medical care between England and Ireland – could be found to fall 
outside Ireland’s margin of appreciation and thereby to fall foul of requirements under 
positive obligations raised under various Articles of the Convention, as argued by the 
applicants in ABC. 
Most significantly, Ireland’s procedural mechanisms for determining when the 
accepted exception to preserve the life of the mother can be activated (ie the process 
of obtaining a diagnosis of certain medical conditions) and ensuring that it can be 
applied effectively, appear to fall outside her margin of appreciation. In other words, 
Ireland can be viewed, following Tysiąc, as having placed the efficacy of access to 
abortion, within the lawful exception, outside her margin of appreciation. Thus the 
Court has a role in relation to monitoring that efficacy, but not in relation to creating 
new exceptions to the prohibition. But even that interpretation of the impact of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine would leave the Court with a great deal of leeway to 
seek to impose improvements on the Irish system – as explored below. Such 
improvements form the central arguments in ABC. Clearly, the legal advisors to the 
applicants consider that concentration on the procedural aspects of the Irish system 
would, following Tysiąc, provide the best chance of mounting successful Convention 
claims since argument based on the margin of appreciation doctrine would be less 
likely to stifle them. In other words, the advisors may consider that, strategically, 
claims based on such aspects might meet with acceptance of the idea that Ireland has 
over-stepped its margin of appreciation in failing to remove barriers in the way of 
accessing abortions within Ireland that are lawfully available. 
Much more controversially, it can be argued that in any event the findings of the 
Court in Vo and Evans are in fact inconsistent with the fundamental rationale of the 
Convention since they would lead to a disregard for forms of suffering for one group 
                                                
14 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 12) at para 72.
5of citizens which have the appearance of rights-violations. They imply that Strasbourg 
would have no role where one group, on grounds of gender, is in effect subjected to 
(often extreme forms of) adverse treatment, due to a Constitutional value. In both Vo
and Evans Strasbourg was not faced with a clash between the claimed rights of the 
mother and the foetus. In a genuine clashing rights case, where those claimed rights 
are clearly opposed, Strasbourg might be prepared to take a different stance towards 
the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine. Strasbourg is not bound by its 
own decisions and its stance as to the extent of the margin of appreciation conceded in 
relation to a particular emergent right has been subject to change, a matter that is 
discussed below. The authority of a Grand Chamber judgment is also viewed as 
greater than that of a Chamber.15 It would therefore be open to the Grand Chamber in 
ABC to find that since the consensus in Europe, as considered in Chapter 2, and under 
international human rights law, as discussed in Chapter 3, is to allow abortion to 
prevent serious risks to the mother’s health, in cases of rape or in respect of extreme 
foetal disability, Ireland has over-stepped its margin of appreciation in refusing to 
allow abortion in any of those circumstances. Therefore, the discussion below will 
proceed on the basis that employment of the margin of appreciation doctrine need not 
preclude acceptance of substantive obligations in relation to restrictive abortion 
regimes, thus accepting creation of a right of access to abortion services, even where 
that involves disregard of a Constitutionally accepted right to life of the foetus.
Clearly, the Grand Chamber could only determine the case in relation to the claims 
raised before it, but ABC does raise the issue of access to abortion to avert a serious 
risk to health on the facts in relation to B and C. If the Grand Chamber adopted the 
stance that a certain margin of appreciation should be accorded to Ireland to 
determine that the right to life of the foetus should be protected from conception 
subject to an Article 8 (or, possibly, 3) obligation to make provision for abortion to 
avert a serious risk to the health of the mother, that finding would then open the way 
to successful future claims based on rape or, possibly, severe foetal disability. In 
effect, such a finding in ABC would make it clear that the margin of appreciation 
conceded to Ireland on the issue of a foetal right to life, was fairly narrow. 
                                                
15 See the view expressed on this point in the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF (no 3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2009] WLR 74 at para 108 per Lord Carswell.
6The case of ABC v Ireland
Facts
A decision in ABC is expected in late 2010; the hearing before the Grand Chamber 
commenced in December 2009. ABC v Ireland,16 if it is declared admissible, would 
require the Chamber to consider in detail the application of rights of the Convention 
to various adverse effects on women in a regime adopting a model of prohibition. The 
claims include rights of access to abortion services in the healthcare context, and 
extend to claims to access to abortion itself where Ireland appears to prohibit it; the 
applicants are bringing these claims under Article 8, and/or Articles 2, 3, 14. The case 
is brought by three women who travelled from Ireland to obtain abortions in England 
for various reasons. None of the applicants conceived intentionally; all failed to 
receive medical advice and abortion aftercare in Ireland in relation to health problems 
arising from the abortions due, they allege, to the Irish prohibition and the criminal 
penalties, since they did not wish to disclose the fact of having had an abortion. In 
each instance accessing an abortion was made more difficult due to the need to travel 
to England.
The first applicant, A, believed at the time of becoming pregnant that her partner was 
infertile; she already had four young children, all of them in care, but was seeking to 
establish the reunification of her family. She considered that having a fifth child 
would jeopardise that successful reunification. The NHS refused to perform the 
abortion at public expense; she therefore had to raise the funds privately, delaying the 
abortion by three weeks. She had to travel to England alone, in secrecy and without 
alerting the social workers or missing a contact visit with her children. On return she 
suffered pain, nausea and prolonged bleeding but was afraid to seek medical advice in 
Ireland in the context of the criminal prohibition. 
The second applicant, B, faced the risk of an ectopic pregnancy which can be lethal 
and which virtually always means that the foetus cannot survive. She was informed 
                                                
16 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (n 2). The case will probably be decided in late 2010 or early 
2011; it has not yet been declared admissible. The hearing on admissibility (significantly) is to come 
before the Grand Chamber (it was moved directly from a hearing by the ordinary Court in June 2009); 
the hearings began in December 2009. 
7that her use of emergency contraception had created the risk of such a pregnancy; she 
was not prepared to become pregnant at that time or to run the risks associated with an 
ectopic pregnancy, and travelled to England for an abortion. After having an abortion 
in the UK and returning to Ireland she passed blood clots which she was afraid to 
have examined – so again she did not obtain access to abortion after-care. 
The third applicant, C, had been having chemotherapy treatment for cancer for three 
years, and underwent tests relating to the cancer at a point when she did not know that 
she was pregnant. She was unable to find a doctor willing to make a determination as 
to whether her life would be placed at risk if she continued to term, or as to the 
significance of the threat to the foetus due to the tests. She could not have a medical 
abortion at a very early stage of the pregnancy in the UK because she could not find a 
clinic that would provide this procedure for a non-resident due to the need for follow-
up care. Thus she had to wait another 8 weeks for a surgical abortion, causing her 
emotional distress. On her return to Ireland she suffered the complications of an 
incomplete abortion, including prolonged bleeding and infection, but was deterred 
from seeking medical care. 
Thus, in addition to medical complications and health concerns, each woman suffered 
hardship and distress in having to travel abroad for an abortion. As regards aftercare, 
the Irish Medical Council’s Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour states: 
…we recognise our responsibility to provide aftercare for women who decide to leave 
the State for termination of pregnancy. We recommend that full support and follow 
up services be made available for all women whose pregnancies have been 
terminated, whatever the circumstances.17
Nevertheless, it appears that in practice women do not consider that they can seek 
such aftercare. This appears to be due to the stigma attached to abortion and to the 
severity and fact of the criminal context.
                                                
17 Medical Council, A Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour, 6th Edition (2004) para 2.5 available 
at <http://www.medicalcouncil.ie/Professional-Standards/Professional-Conduct-Ethics/> accessed 
29.09.10. 
8Admissibility
It is possible that ABC v Ireland may be found to be inadmissible (Article 35) on the 
basis of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as occurred in the case of D v Ireland.18
The Irish Supreme Court can consider any case involving interplay between the rights 
of the mother to her own independence and bodily integrity and the rights of the 
foetus, and no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for all time. 
Thus, leeway might exist, allowing the Supreme Court to have considered at least the 
cases of C and B. The Strasbourg Court in D v Ireland referred to its statement in 
Selmouni v France19 that Article 35 is designed to give states the opportunity to 
prevent or remedy rights violations in domestic law – the requirement to test the 
domestic remedies. The Strasbourg Court in D further referred20 to the comments of 
the Chief Justice of the Irish Supreme Court in Attorney-General v X,21 to the effect 
that the issue raised in D was ‘peculiarly appropriate and illuminating in the 
interpretation of [the Eighth Amendment] which deals with the intimate human 
problem of the right of the unborn to life and its relationship to the right of the mother 
of an unborn child to her life.’ The Irish European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003 also provides a mechanism by which applicants can plead their Convention 
rights in domestic courts. To protect confidentiality, the Publicity Rule in Ireland 
allows persons to apply for in camera (not public) proceedings, and certain practices 
in Irish judicial procedure allow for women seeking abortions to keep their identities 
secret. Taking all these factors into account, a case can be made for the non-
admissibility of at least some of the claims in ABC.
However, the cases of A, B and C are, to varying extents, distinguishable from that in 
D on the admissibility issue since the applicants were not confronted with the 
extremely unusual and exceptionally distressing circumstances that faced D. Certain 
claims in ABC v Ireland directly challenge Ireland's general prohibition of abortion, 
and the related impact on healthcare services, and do not seek to make an inroad into 
it through an implied exception relating to the status of foetuses suffering from 
                                                
18 D v Ireland (Admissibility) (App no 26499/02) (2006) 43 EHRR SE 16.
19 Selmouni v France (App no 25803/94) at para 74. 
20 D v Ireland (Admissibility) (n 18) at para 90.
21 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1 at 147; see chapter 2 p 10.
9abnormalities incompatible with survival, as in the D case.22 On the other hand, two 
of the claims do appear to rely partially on an existing exception. The Grand Chamber 
may be persuaded that insofar as B and C rest their claim on an obligation to provide 
access to abortion to avert a potentially serious risk to health, they could not have 
found meaningful relief in the Irish courts since no exception exists relating to a threat 
to the health of the mother, whereas in D the Irish government recognised the 
possibility that an implied exception might apply in her near-unique circumstances. 
The government would be very hard-pressed to argue that an exception would apply 
in the far broader circumstances of A. A further factor that might influence the Court 
is that if it was prepared indefinitely to accept that a very doubtfully applicable 
remedy must be exhausted, applicants could be placed in a position of prolonged 
uncertainty in which they could obtain no remedy domestically or at Strasbourg. In 
other words, if the Grand Chamber took a very state-friendly stance towards 
admissibility the Irish government would be able to take advantage of a position 
whereby they hold out a remedy as potentially available domestically which in 
practice would almost certainly be denied, in order to stifle Strasbourg claims which 
could lead to real relief for women.
Possibly the cases of B and C might be found partially inadmissible on the basis that 
Ireland does provide for abortion where the life of the mother may be at risk – in both 
it was arguable that that was the case. So it could be argued that the doubt should have 
been resolved domestically. On the other hand, in both cases the risk to life was 
unclear – due, it seems, to medical obstructiveness – and could be viewed as low; a 
case could readily be made that Ireland does not appear in practice to make any 
provision for abortion unless the risk to the mother’s life is far more clearly 
established. The applicants B and C are also arguing that there was no likelihood of 
obtaining a domestic remedy in respect of abortion to alleviate a risk to health, an 
argument that the state is unlikely to be able to refute. One further aspect of all three 
cases is likely to be found admissible. The applicants are all raising questions of the 
lack of certainty as to whether abortion aftercare is in practice available in Ireland 
without risking extreme stigma and other possible adverse consequences. Arguably, 
                                                
22 S Bottinni ‘Europe’s Rebellious Daughter: will Ireland be forced to conform its abortion laws to that 
of its neighbours?’ (2007) 49 Journal of Church and State 211, 243.
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no timely applicable court procedure was available in the circumstances the applicants 
were in that would have allowed domestic resolution of those issues. 
There are at present signs that the case is unlikely to be dismissed as wholly 
inadmissible. Before the lower Chamber reached a decision, the matter was referred to 
the Grand Chamber. That was a highly unusual development in the process of a case 
and a signal that the Court may be preparing to issue what it considers to be an 
historic decision. It would be unlikely that all nineteen judges would be gathered 
together merely to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This chapter turns to 
considering the specific claims being raised in ABC, the implications of the possible 
outcomes for future cases, and certain further possible and pending claims.
Protection of physical/mental wellbeing or autonomy: development of rights of 
access to abortion services and to healthcare under Article 8 
Preliminary comments
The obligation, which can include both negative and positive aspects, to respect 
private life under Article 8(1)23 has been found to mean that a breach of Article 8 may 
arise where the state has put in place a legal framework denying respect for autonomy 
in relation to intimate aspects of private life, in particular physical integrity and sexual 
life.24 This stance has been taken despite the wide discretion at times afforded to the 
state regarding its choice of measures intended to protect the rights of others or 
morals:25 in the case of Dudgeon26 the Court considered that there had to be 
                                                
23 Positive obligations require the state to go beyond merely abstaining from interference, but instead 
to adopt measures that secure the right protected. See eg Van Kück v Germany (App no 35968/97) 
(2003) 37 EHRR 51 at para 70. The justification for the imposition of such obligations., referred to in 
Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 115, is that the Convention guarantees rights that ‘are not theoretical or 
illusory but practical and effective’ (Ilhan v Turkey (App no 22277/93) (2002) 34 EHRR 869 at para 
91). 
24 For example, Article 8 has been found to cover obligations on the state to respect homosexual 
orientation and therefore penalising homosexual practices created a breach of Article 8, regardless of 
the enforcement of the penalty: Dudgeon v United Kingdom (App no 7525/76) (1982) 4 EHRR 149 at 
para 41 and see van Kück v Germany (n 23) in which the Court found that requirements attached to 
medical insurance which prevented transsexual reassignment surgery being covered by the scheme 
were disproportionate.
25 Andersson (Margaretta) v Sweden (App no 12963/87) (1992) EHRR 615; Muller v Switzerland
(App no 10737/84) (1988) 13 EHRR 212.
26 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n 23).
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sufficiently serious reasons for penalising the practice, going beyond a popular 
conception of the practice as immoral.27 This stance may also, in certain 
circumstances, found the imposition of positive obligations; Strasbourg has applied 
this approach to the issue of abortion, as described in Chapter 3,28 in relation to the 
freedom to develop sexual relationships, a point accepted by the Court in relation to 
pregnancy in Brüggemann v Germany,29 and in relation to physical wellbeing in 
Tysiąc v Poland.30
However, although Convention case-law on positive obligations to secure ‘personal 
autonomy’ in relation to medical interventions or as an aspect of personal 
development could potentially found recognition of a ‘right of access to abortion’, as 
the applicants argued in Brüggemann, it is suggested that at present that step would be 
viewed as far too controversial and as inconsistent with the application of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine in this context. Thus, the Court is likely to decide the matter 
in part in relation to the narrower positive obligation – to ensure effective access to 
lawful abortion – recognised in Tysiąc. It may go further and decide that a lawful 
exception to save the life of the mother must be broadened to include an exception for 
the avoidance of serious health risks. 
In Brüggemann it was suggested on behalf of the state that it was relevant to the issue 
of proportionality that Germany had provided for lawful abortion in the cases of 
danger to life or health, foetal disability and rape since that position showed sufficient 
respect for the ‘private life’ elements of abortion.31 Therefore the Court is unlikely to 
find that a regime that makes such provision but otherwise restricts the choice of the 
woman would infringe Article 8.32 That is probably correct at present. However, that 
case was decided almost 30 years ago and in light of the evolving nature of the 
                                                
27 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n 23) at para 60.
28 Pp 1-2 and 4-7.
29 Brüggemann and Scheuten v The Federal Republic of Germany (Decision) (App no 6959/75) (1977) 
5 DR 103 at para 55; see also Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n 23) at para 41.
30 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at paras 106 and 109. See also Dickson v United Kingdom (GC) (App no 
44362/04) (2008) 46 EHRR 41 at para 60 and S H and others v Austria (App no 57813/00) at para 58.
31 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 29) at para 62. This point was not determinative.
32 M Krzyanowska-Mierzewska ‘How to Use the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Matters of Reproductive Law: The Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights <http://www.astra.org.pl/astra_guide.htm> accessed 29.09.10 Pt III.
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Convention the Court has leeway in future to alter that stance. Thus at the present 
time it will be argued below, especially in relation to the claims in ABC, that no free-
standing ‘right to abortion’ is likely to be recognised yet based on choice, under 
Article 8. But the narrower positive obligations that might be recognised could 
include: a positive obligation to ensure that abortion that is already lawfully available, 
even in a regime relying on the Prohibition model, is available in practice; an 
obligation to ensure that medical treatment that is lawfully available, including 
abortion aftercare, is made effectively available; an obligation to allow abortion to 
prevent serious risks to the health of the mother without imposing on her the necessity 
of travelling abroad or seeking an illegal abortion. On that basis the value of 
autonomy under Article 8 would receive indirect recognition.
The application of the rule from Tysiąc
The applicant in Tysiąc argued under Article 8 that her moral and physical integrity 
had been interfered with due to Poland’s lack of provision of lawful abortion in her 
circumstances. But Strasbourg confined the finding of a breach of Article 8 to the 
failure to provide timely, effective and impartial procedures to obtain redress where 
abortion was denied though legally permitted. Tysiąc appeared to fulfil the domestic 
requirements for abortion, although medical opinion was divided and the precise level 
of risk of damage to her eyesight needed to trigger the exception was unclear – one 
aspect of her complaint.33 Thus one implication of this case for states in fulfilling their 
Article 8 obligations in relation to access to abortion is that the obligation was found 
to be linked to the pre-existing legal regime in the state in question, rather than 
requiring a ‘free-standing’ right of access to abortion. That interpretation would 
accord with the fact that the case did not ultimately require Poland to change the law 
regarding access to abortion although the case did require that there should be 
effective access under that law.34 It follows that where states set out indications in 
law, in particular statutory provisions as in Poland, as to health-based grounds for 
                                                
33 In Polish law that it ‘constitutes a threat to ... the health of the pregnant woman’ see Tysiąc v Poland 
(n 1) at para 36 et seq also see chapter 2 note 33. The application of this exception to Tysiąc was 
confirmed by a doctor other than the one involved in finally certifying the abortion at a state hospital. 
34 It is not possible to be certain at present that this has occurred see chapter 2 text to note 46; see also 
W Nowicka (ed) Reproductive Rights in Poland – the effects of the anti-abortion law (Mar 2008)
Bondor ‘Analysis of court cases’ at p 63 
<http://www.federa.org.pl/publikacje/report%20Federa_eng_NET.PDF> accessed 29.09.10. 
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legal abortion, these require legal clarity and an effective and timely review procedure 
to determine their applicability in practice. Women, in other words, must be able to 
use the provisions to avoid the healthcare risks they were apparently intended to 
protect against – they must not provide a phantom access to abortion only. This point 
has also been raised in relation to the exception in the Polish statutory framework 
regulating abortion allowing for abortion in respect of foetal disability in an 
application post-Tysiąc: RR v Poland35 (the facts of which are discussed in relation to 
Article 3 below).
Thus the interpretation of Article 8 that the Court adopted in Tysiąc v Poland does not 
translate very readily or directly to states adopting the Prohibition model, such as 
Ireland. Under that model in Ireland legal exceptions are not set out under statute or in 
the Constitution, and only one exception, to save the life of the mother, is accorded 
any recognition, via a court ruling. However, it is submitted that uncertainty created 
for women in relation to access to abortion services to preserve women’s health in 
regimes adopting any form of legal regulation of abortion is within the obligation 
recognised in Tysiąc v Poland. In other words, if Ireland purports to provide abortion 
aftercare, purports to allow abortion abroad and to save the life of the mother, 
effective access to such provision should be ensured (although this argument could 
pose a problem in relation to admissibility – see above).36 It is further possible that 
Article 8 obligations to respect physical integrity could extend to a requirement that 
existing exceptions under general legal principles (for example those recognised by 
the Irish Constitutional Court) in states adopting a Prohibition model should be 
clarified, even broadened slightly, to include those seeking domestic abortion, as was 
argued by the applicants in D v Ireland, where an existing exception (implied or 
express) might be applicable.37 It is clear that the inherently vague exception to the 
application of the criminal law relevant in the ABC case creates a ‘situation of 
prolonged uncertainty’. This forms part of the basis for the applicants’ case under 
Article 8 in ABC ‘since the Constitutional term ‘unborn’ is vague and since the 
                                                
35 RR v Poland (App no 27617/04) (2008) 47 EHRR SE14 (communicated cases); The Center for 
Reproductive Rights are collaborating in the case: see at <http://reproductiverights.org/en/case/rr-v-
poland> accessed 29.09.10. 
36 Pp 5-6.
37 See above pp 5-6.
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criminal prohibition is open to different interpretations.'38 The women were placed in 
a position where they were afraid to seek to access a range of abortion-related services 
due to their fear that merely seeking to do so might expose them to the risk of 
imposition of criminal liability; those who could potentially offer the services 
appeared to be in the same position. 
Thus, the Grand Chamber in the cases of B and C could apply the rule as to effective
access from Tysiąc39 to the situation in Ireland. As a result it might be found that 
Ireland must ensure that the criminal prohibition on performing abortions does not 
inhibit doctors from diagnosing a risk to life or deter women from seeking medical 
help. The Court in Tysiąc considered that the Polish laws against abortion had had a 
‘chilling effect’ on doctors who might otherwise have approved an abortion for health 
reasons. B and C can similarly argue that there is a chilling effect on doctors in 
Ireland since even where a mother’s life is threatened, doctors may show reluctance to 
find that that is the case. Questions are also likely to be raised as to the likelihood that 
abortion would have been available in either case in Ireland if a degree of risk to life 
had been found, although in both cases the risk appeared to be fairly small. The Court 
might be prepared to find that Ireland must also clarify that issue – since both women 
appear to have assumed that although there appeared to be some risk to their lives, 
they would be unable to access abortion except by travelling abroad. C in particular 
was unable to find a doctor willing to determine whether her life was at risk in order 
for her to activate the exception in Ireland and obtain an abortion. The result of any 
such determination in this case at Strasbourg could be that in effect the exception in 
relation to the risk to life in Ireland is broadened to include cases of serious risks to 
health where the possibility of a risk to life could not be ruled out. 
A breach of Article 8 could therefore be found in ABC in relation to B and C on the 
basis that Ireland must make clearer and more effective provision for access to 
abortion where a serious risk to the mother’s health arises that may be life-
threatening. That would constitute some broadening of the recognition of access to 
abortion under Article 8 that was accepted in Tysiąc due to the different nature of the 
                                                
38 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (n 2) COMPLAINTS para 3. 
39 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1).
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restrictive Irish regime – since it is based on a prohibition. In Tysiąc, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Court found that ‘[o]nce the legislature decides to allow abortion, it 
must not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real possibilities to 
obtain it.’40 But the underlying premise behind that finding from Tysiąc was that 
Polish law recognises the legitimacy of abortion in principle and accepts that the 
foetus’s life is not of equal status to that of the mother. That is not the case in Ireland 
but, nevertheless, it does purport to allow abortion in the one circumstance of risk to 
the mother’s life, which might have applied in B and C’s cases. Thus, the finding 
from Tysiąc could be applied to Ireland without necessarily requiring that Ireland’s 
position as to the status of the foetus should change. 
Abortion aftercare in Ireland
The Grand Chamber in the ABC case could also apply the Tysiąc interpretation of the 
requirements of the positive obligation to secure physical/mental integrity under 
Article 8 to find that Ireland is required to clear up the fear and uncertainty 
surrounding the question of access to aftercare services due to the criminal 
prohibition. Thus Article 8 may be found to require in relation to all three applicants 
that the use of the criminal prohibition should be clarified to make it much clearer that 
it does not affect abortion aftercare or continuity of medical care between the 
providing abortion clinic abroad and medical services in Ireland. These points could 
also be raised under Article 8 read with Article 14 (considered below). If a woman 
presented herself to a hospital suffering from pain and bleeding or passing blood clots 
due, for example, to heavy periods or the menopause, treatment would normally be 
available. Thus the Court might be prepared to find in relation to all three applicants 
that where a medical procedure is generally available to the population, a breach of 
Article 8 will arise if, though ‘legal’, it is not in practice made accessible to women 
where it concerns abortion aftercare. Account would probably be taken of the failure 
of the state to address the underlying reluctance of doctors to provide such aftercare or 
of women to access it. Such a finding would constitute an application of the Tysiąc
rule since, as indicated above, Ireland does purport to provide abortion aftercare when 
a woman has travelled abroad for an abortion. It is submitted that this healthcare 
                                                
40 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 116.
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aspect of the claim in ABC is the most likely to succeed, since it addresses the core of 
the applicant’s complaints which relate to the lack of provision for medical care for 
those who have undergone an abortion, rather than to the further matter (which is 
additionally politically and ethically controversial) of broadening access to abortion in 
Ireland. As discussed above, Strasbourg might maintain the stance that the latter issue 
remains within Ireland’s margin of appreciation.
An obligation under Article 8 to create availability of abortion outside a current state 
exception?
The previously stated position of the Court is that, unlike Treaties that protect social 
or cultural rights, the Convention does not provide for any specific general level of 
healthcare among contracting parties, since such matters ultimately fall within the 
state’s margin of appreciation,41 and, as discussed in Chapter 2, the jurisprudence 
provides little support for placing an obligation on the state to legalise termination of 
pregnancy. However, there has been recent development as to the nature of the 
positive obligations placed on the state, amounting to a demand to provide certain 
medical procedures in specific circumstances. In Dickson42 the Grand Chamber 
decided that a violation of Article 8 had arisen where artificial insemination facilities 
were denied to a prisoner, on the basis that a failure to strike a fair balance between 
the interests involved was apparent. The Court came to this determination without 
deciding whether this was a positive or negative obligation.43 That stance contrasted 
with the reasoning of the 4th Chamber in that case44 to the effect that the withdrawal 
of such facilities would have related to the imposition of a positive obligation which 
the state did not have to undertake to avoid a violation of Article 8; it was found that 
the balancing of the interests that was undertaken was within the state’s margin of 
appreciation.45 While the significance of the judgment should not be overstated – the 
Grand Chamber repeatedly emphasised the importance of the context of 
                                                
41 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 109. See further Krzyanowska-Mierzewska ‘How to use the European 
Convention’ (n 32) Pt III.
42 Dickson v United Kingdom (GC) (n 30). 
43 Dickson v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21 at para 40.
44 Dickson v United Kingdom (n 43).
45 Dickson v United Kingdom (n 43) at paras 26-40.
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imprisonment46 – this case casts some doubt on the general reluctance to recognise 
positive obligations to make medical procedures available under Article 8.47
The Chamber could take a far more radical step in ABC than that proposed above 
which is to find under Article 8 that Ireland should provide for abortion where a 
serious, non-life threatening risk to the mother’s health arises (which may have been 
the case in relation to C). While this goes beyond the main rule from Tysiąc, since 
Ireland does not already provide for access to abortion in that circumstance, this 
arguably reflects the Court’s particular concern in Tysiąc for the preservation of 
physical integrity, which may even extend to a requirement for provision of 
therapeutic abortion where, due to adoption of a Prohibition model, there is no 
‘balancing of privacy and public interest’.48 Such an approach would arguably imply 
that Ireland should accept the legitimacy of abortion in principle. Thus the Court 
could recognise for the first time that an obligation arises that requires that abortion is 
made available as a medical procedure in order to secure the physical integrity of a 
state’s citizens where no provision is already made to do so. The applicants in ABC 
have not limited their claim to the application of exceptions already recognised in 
case law, but complain further that ‘the fact that abortion was available in Ireland only 
in very limited circumstances was disproportionate and excessive’.49
The Court might prefer to avoid the question of whether Article 8 requires that some 
degree of access to abortion should be made available outside the circumstances 
specified by the state as allowing it to occur by finding that to be a matter beyond the 
scope of its enquiry, as it did in Tysiąc.50 It is submitted that that would be a stance of 
expedience rather than a principled rejection of such an obligation that would rule out 
its future emergence.51 The Court as a rule avoids deciding more than it needs to in 
                                                
46 Dickson v United Kingdom (GC) (n 30) at para 68.
47 See eg Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 29) and the approach of the Court in Dickson v 
United Kingdom (n 43) at para 40. 
48 See chapter 3 pp 5-7, Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 107 and Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of 
Appreciation’ (n 10) at p 376.
49 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (n 2) COMLPAINTS para 3.
50 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 106.
51 See further chapter 6 pp 4-5.
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order to determine the question it confronts in the particular instance before it.52 In 
Tysiąc, the Court had available to it a different and less controversial route to a 
finding of a breach of Article 8, as described above. But if, as in the case of Ireland, 
the state does not purport to provide access to an abortion in the compelling 
circumstance of averting a real risk to health, the Court would be unable to evade this 
issue. Women who have a settled determination on health or other grounds to avoid 
an unwanted pregnancy denied legal abortion domestically are in effect forced to 
undergo illegal, often unsafe, domestic abortions or travel abroad – as the 3 applicants 
in ABC did. Forced travel abroad may create severe stress and entail a delayed 
abortion; health care provision may also be impaired – the key issue in ABC. The 
Court may also be influenced by the general context of prevalent illegal abortion, as 
some have argued the Court was in Tysiąc,53 which includes physical suffering, an 
adverse impact on health and even death.54 As discussed in Chapter 3,55 it is arguable 
that the Court came close to recognising impliedly a right of access to abortion in 
Tysiąc: bearing the general position as to access in Europe in mind, and the severe 
consequences for women if abortion is not domestically available, there are grounds 
for considering – as mentioned above – that states in that situation might be found to 
have over-stepped their margin of appreciation in prohibiting abortion. (Such claims 
could also be developed in relation to Article 3, which will be discussed below.) 
Taking all these matters into account, a bold Grand Chamber in ABC could impose on 
Ireland an obligation under Article 8 to allow access to abortion to avoid a very 
serious risk to the mother’s health, even where her life was not in danger.56  
Article 8: the question of abortion on ‘social grounds’ and the need to travel abroad
The situation of applicant A in ABC v Ireland (see above) raises the even more 
controversial issue of access to abortion on social grounds. The Grand Chamber could 
                                                
52 See Gillan v UK (App no 4158/05) (2010) 50 EHRR 45 in which the Court did not determine the 
issue in front of it under Article 5, leaving that issue open, since it could determine the issue under 
Article 8.
53 See chapter 3 p 6; see also Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) Dissenting opinion of Judge Borreggo Borreggo at 
para 3, Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 10) at p 375 and Cornides ‘Human Rights 
Pitted Against Man’ (2008) 12 Int J HR 107, 130.
54 Amnesty International Oct 2009 EUR 37/002/2009, see at <http://www.amnesty.org> accessed 
29.09.10. 
55 Pp 6-7.
56 A future case could raise the question of access in cases of rape, regardless of the issue of suicide.
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apply this extended interpretation of the approach of the Court in Tysiąc to find that 
Ireland should provide access to abortion in her circumstances. Such a finding would 
demand that Ireland create a further new, extremely controversial exception to the 
prohibition on abortion, allowing access to abortion on social grounds. That would 
demand a radical change to its Constitutional protection for the foetus. While a 
general right to certain medical procedures may be clearly beyond the scope of the 
Convention, in specific cases rights of access may be found, as in Dickson. Early 
termination is a good example of a medical procedure that is denied in most 
circumstances in Poland and Ireland, but not on the grounds of resource, and which is 
available in the rest of Europe. Therefore it is arguably an exceptional instance by 
analogy with the prohibition on artificial insemination at issue in Dickson. That 
argument could be supported on the basis that vulnerable and poor women – who are 
less able to travel for or to pay for an abortion – are disproportionately affected by the 
prohibition, a feature of A’s case. However, the Grand Chamber would be unlikely to 
embark on a course that could create such a dramatic, direct confrontation with 
Ireland and would be more likely to view the decision not to provide for abortion on 
social grounds as within its margin of appreciation, allowing it some scope to protect 
a foetal right to life. It is much more likely to take a restrained approach; it might 
therefore be prepared only to find that Ireland had breached its positive obligations 
under Article 8 by failing to facilitate her travel to the UK by providing public funds 
for women at a certain level of poverty, on the basis that since travelling for abortion 
is permitted, it should be capable of being accorded to women regardless of their 
economic position. 
Justifying lack of access to abortion under Article 8(2)
So far the question of proportionality under Art 8(2) has not been raised at Strasbourg 
in the context of a woman’s claim to access abortion: in Tysiąc the claim was 
determined within the ambit of Article 8(1). As far as Ireland is concerned, reliance 
on Article 8(2) in an instance in which a woman’s health was potentially seriously 
affected by a failure to provide an abortion, as in the cases of B and C, would only be 
likely to succeed if Ireland persuaded the Grand Chamber to accept that the foetus has 
a right to life within Article 2. It would be unlikely to accept that argument since 
making such a finding would place all the laws allowing access to abortion in Europe 
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in jeopardy. That evasive stance would be in line with Vo57 and with Open Door,58 in 
relation to Article 10(2), in which the Court avoided answering the government’s 
argument that the foetus was an ‘other’ subject to such protection. A further 
possibility would be to recognise an interest of the foetus that could be captured by 
the term ‘rights of others’ in Art 8(2) without making a specific determination as to 
the nature of the right. Strasbourg typically employs a generous interpretation of what 
may constitute a ‘legitimate aim’ under the broad exceptions listed in paragraph 2 of 
Articles 8-1159 and could therefore leave the question of the particular ‘right’ in 
question open. The right of ‘others’ in question arguably need not be a Convention 
right possessed by the foetus – it could merely refer to foetal interests or to general 
rights to healthcare aimed at protecting pregnancy.60 An alternative justificatory 
ground under Article 8(2) that is potentially relevant is that of the protection of 
morals. In Open Door the ECtHR held that the Irish restrictions on provision of 
information in relation to abortion services abroad had the legitimate aim of the 
protection of morals in that the question of foetal life related to a ‘profound moral 
value’.61
But these lesser justifications would be unlikely, on grounds of necessity, to be 
capable of overcoming a right of access to abortion under Article 8(1): for instance, 
the protection of morals has never been considered by the Court to merit restriction of 
physical liberty or fundamental choice in relation to bodily integrity.62 In the case of 
Open Door itself this legitimate aim was deemed on grounds of proportionality not to 
require an absolute ban on publication and dissemination of details of abortion 
agencies abroad. It is reasonably clear that, as emphasised in the dissenting opinion of 
JES Fawcett in Brüggemann, in the absence of a reliance on ‘a foetal right to life’, no 
other sufficiently weighty interest would be available to displace the interest of the 
woman in being able to end a pregnancy.63 Thus these justifications would carry little 
                                                
57 Vo v France (n 7).
58 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 12).
59 See e.g. Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, 
Oxford OUP, 2009) at p 407.
60 See e.g. Olsson v Sweden (App no 13441/87) (1994) 11 EHRR 259 at para 119.
61 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 12) at para 63.
62 See in particular Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n 23) at para 37.
63 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 29) Dissenting Opinion of Mr JES Fawcett para 5-6.
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weight in relation to the claims of B and C to obtain access to an effective medical 
procedure to determine whether a risk to life or a serious risk to health arose, 
assuming that those claims were accepted as within the ambit of Art 8(1). The 
challenge of A relates to the social and familial impact of an unwanted pregnancy, 
and thus a wider margin of appreciation would probably be conceded to the state in 
determining that such a claim fell outside the ambit of Art 8(1), as discussed above. 
Assuming that it was found that Ireland was under an obligation to facilitate travel, 
the interests discussed could potentially have some weight. Nevertheless, it would be 
difficult to establish that an implicit requirement to travel secretly for a termination, 
and creation of a delay in accessing an abortion, could be viewed as a proportionate 
restriction. It would be hard to establish a rational connection between creating delay 
in accessing an abortion, and seeking to afford protection to the interests of the foetus. 
A further point that may be raised in ABC, or could be raised in future applications, 
arises in relation to the exceptionally draconian nature of the penalties available for 
abortion in Ireland, which include life imprisonment for the woman. If the Irish 
government argues that the criminal penalties are intended to protect the rights of 
others under Art 8(2), the Court may concede a broad margin of appreciation to 
Ireland on grounds of the religiously controversial nature of the issue, but the law 
might nevertheless be found to fail to satisfy the demands of proportionality under 
Article 8(2). This would be likely to be the case even if in practice life imprisonment 
was not imposed.64
Freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment: developments under Article 3 
Strasbourg has not yet accepted that effectively forcing a woman to go through a 
pregnancy resulting from rape, or where the foetus is fatally disabled, or where her 
health will be severely placed at risk, as can occur in restrictive regimes, whether 
provided for in law or not, amounts to Article 3 treatment. As was discussed in the 
previous Chapter it is a feature of international human rights law that the Article 3 
                                                
64 See Dudgeon v United Kingdom (n 23) at para 41.
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guarantee can be interpreted to encapsulate the distress and humiliation65 engendered 
by the denial of abortion services in certain situations such as rape or fatal foetal 
impairment. There is also some support for this argument where the woman as a result 
suffers severe impairment of health, as argued by the applicant in Tysiąc.66 Thus, it is 
possible that Strasbourg might be prepared to take this step. The ECtHR has 
confirmed that this Article can found positive obligations to prevent inhuman or 
degrading treatment.67
If the Court accepted a positive obligation to set up a legal framework for abortion 
regulation that provided for abortion where the consequences for the woman of an 
unwanted pregnancy amounted to Art 3 treatment, then regimes that adopt a 
Prohibition model of abortion, as in Ireland, could readily be found to breach Article 
3. This would establish a ‘right of access to abortion,’ under the Convention, albeit in 
very narrow circumstances, based on a failure of the state to fulfil its positive 
obligations under Article 3. An argument of this nature was raised at Strasbourg in D 
v Ireland (admissibility).68 In that case the applicant found after a scan that one of the 
twins she was carrying had died while the other was suffering from a severe foetal 
abnormality which limited survival outside the womb to an average of 6 days 
(anencephaly – lack of a brain). She did not embark on any course of domestic 
litigation since the only analogous case law related to the threat of suicide where the 
woman had been raped.69 Having obtained an abortion in England, she was unable to 
access full medical after-care, including genetic counselling, in Ireland, due to 
restrictions linked to the Irish prohibition and the criminal penalties relating to it. She 
complained at Strasbourg that the prohibition had led to violation of her rights under 
                                                
65 The ECtHR has recognised that degrading treatment includes ‘feelings of fear, anguish and 
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EHRR 198 at para 92.
66 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 64-8.
67 See eg Aksoy v Turkey (App no 21987/93) (1997) EHRR 553 and C Ovey and R White Jacobs & 
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Articles 3 in relation to the mental suffering she was forced to endure,70 but as 
mentioned above, the claim was found inadmissible.
However, the acceptance of an obligation under Article 3 to provide access to 
abortion in very narrow circumstances, requiring the creation of a new legal exception 
in Ireland is unlikely to be recognised, for example, in the circumstances of ABC – not 
because it is out of line with Convention principles, but due to the fact that in 
practice, even though a legal prohibition is in place, the woman will often access an 
abortion abroad, as in Ireland, and the Court does not therefore have to adopt such a 
controversial position as to find a violation under Article 3.71 The Court is more likely 
to recognise a less controversial Article 3 obligation – the requirement of a legal 
framework to ensure that women can obtain after-abortion services that are legally 
available in the state. The ECtHR has acknowledged positive obligations under this 
Article in relation to the requirement of the proper investigation of rape in MC v 
Bulgaria,72 thus recognising the seriousness of the humiliation and distress caused by 
rape. This finding therefore provides support for acceptance of other analogous 
positive obligations, possibly including ineffective provision of abortion aftercare 
where the abortion was undertaken in stressful conditions and/or to avoid serious 
health risks. Further, in a suitable case an analogy could be drawn between the 
suffering caused to the woman by the state’s lack of an effective legal framework for 
prosecuting rapists and the suffering caused by the state’s lack of a legal framework to 
address the effects of rape – including denying access to abortion where the 
pregnancy is the result of rape. 
The application of RR v Poland submitted to the Court in 200473 claims that a positive 
obligation should be recognised under Article 3 to ensure that diagnostic tests to 
establish foetal disability should be available in practice in order to bring a woman 
within the Polish exception and permit abortion, depending on the results. In RR the 
applicant was informed on the basis of an initial ultrasound test that the foetus might 
be suffering from Turner’s syndrome; she required a further genetic examination but 
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she was unable to gain a referral by her local physician for this test and was 
subsequently refused testing in public hospitals until admitted as an emergency 
patient in the 23rd week of her pregnancy. By the time she was able to gain permission 
for an abortion on the ground of foetal disability it was unlawful in Polish law to have 
one, and she was also unable to gain domestic redress.  Her argument is being brought 
under the ‘degrading treatment’ head of Art 3. If successful, as the Polish Federation 
for Women and Family Planning argue,74 her claim would place greater pressure on 
Poland than Tysiąc did to undergo more far-reaching reforms to its medical 
framework allowing for abortion, within its accepted exceptions.
Protection for the life of the woman: Article 2 
A breach of Article 2 of the ECHR could be claimed where a woman’s life was put in 
danger by preventing her from having an abortion, both in so far as a prohibition 
could be considered as having that direct result,75 and in so far as the state would be 
failing in its positive obligation to protect the lives of its citizens.76 Clearly, these 
issues would arise in a non-abstract sense77 if, for example, a pregnant woman 
suffered a complication threatening her life that could only be resolved by aborting 
the foetus. Denial of healthcare which is ‘available to the general population’ and 
which could save the life of a person who was denied it was held to be capable of 
breaching Article 2 in Cyprus v Turkey.78
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Article 2 has been held to impose certain procedural obligations in relation to the 
creation of risks to life. Such obligations have been held to arise in relation to the 
provision of healthcare and the requirement to undertake effective investigations into 
the cause of death:
The positive obligations [under Article 2] require States to make regulations 
compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the 
protection of their patients’ lives. They also require an effective independent judicial 
system to be set up so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical 
profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those 
responsible made accountable.79
This obligation could arise in relation to denial of abortion as a form of healthcare 
where a risk exists to the health or life of the mother, potentially including a risk of 
suicide.80 In procedural terms, if deaths are caused directly by state agents in the 
context of, for example, a hostage situation, there must be a clear and accessible basis 
in law for the action taken.81 By analogy, in the context of positive obligations under 
Article 2, an obligation to provide readily available medical care to safeguard life 
could be extended to require state regulations intended to obviate risk to life to be 
effective. Such positive obligation could take the form of a requirement to adopt an 
effective legal framework that protects the life of pregnant women whose lives are 
threatened by their pregnancy. Where any provision available was rendered 
ineffective due to prevalent anti-abortion attitudes in the medical establishment 
engendered by restrictive regimes (e.g. the ‘chilling effects’ referred to in Tysiąc and 
claimed in ABC)82 the state would under this argument have to take steps to address 
the inefficacy. The applicant presented her case on that basis in the recent application 
to the Court in Z v Poland,83 sponsored by the Centre for Reproductive Rights, and 
currently pending before the Court. The application involves a pregnant woman who 
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died as a result of an ulcerative colitis; it is alleged in the claim that doctors failed to 
perform further examinations on her which would have improved their attempts to 
fight this disease. The applicant’s argument (the case is being brought by her mother) 
is that they failed to do so due to her pregnancy since they were reluctant to perform 
further examinations that would have involved endangering the foetus.
Further, where a state has determined that a pregnant woman is permitted to have an 
abortion where her life is threatened it may be argued as an aspect of a positive 
obligation under Article 2 that this exception to a general prohibition should be 
clearly defined. This has particular relevance in the abortion context to the issue of 
suicide.84 Procedural obligations, at a minimum, require that deaths caused directly by 
state agents85 must be able to be investigated by an effective court procedure;86 by 
analogy, a procedure should arguably be available allowing a woman at risk of suicide 
who has been refused an abortion to challenge the refusal. An analogous issue is 
raised by the third applicant in ABC, who suffered from cancer and required 
chemotherapy. She is claiming that the ‘lack of clear legal guidelines regarding the 
circumstances in which a woman may have an abortion to save her life’ infringed her 
rights under Article 2.87 This would be the first time that the Court has considered 
such a claim in relation to abortion; the key question concerning the success of this 
aspect of the application is whether the Grand Chamber considers that this actually 
concerns the applicant on the facts – so it is not an abstract question. The Chamber is 
likely to conclude that the lack of clear guidelines did not in C’s case expose her to a 
risk of death, due to the possibility of obtaining an abortion in England. However, the 
Court could be moved by general consideration of the situation of women in Ireland, 
as arguably it was in Tysiąc, and therefore read into the facts the likelihood that the 
failure to accord her an abortion led to a significant risk to her life. Despite this, it is 
                                                
84 International human rights treaties have highlighted the problem of maternal mortality due to 
suicide where pregnancy in extreme circumstances such as rape is prohibited: chapter 4 pp 1-4; see also 
in relation to Irish law chapter 2 pp 11-12.
85 Under Protocol 6 (peacetime) and 13 (generally) the member state is not permitted to use the death 
penalty. Killing by state agents potentially breaches Article 2, but Article 2 contains exceptions in para 
2 in which causing death is permitted in narrow circumstances.
86 The Court held in McCann v United Kingdom (A/324) (1996) 21 EHRR 47 that the procedures in 
relation to the investigation of suspicious deaths need to be effective in order to satisfy the 
requirements of A2(2). This reasoning could be transposed into cases of positive obligations under 
Article 2 in relation to the ambit of the right. 
87 ABC v Ireland (n 2) COMPLAINTS para 1.
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more likely in relation to C that the Chamber would opt for a solution under a 
qualified Article such as Article 8, as discussed above. If it did decide that Article 2 
applied then, as discussed, it is clearly arguable that in failing to set out clear legal 
guidelines the Irish government failed to meet the standards required by its positive 
obligations under Article 2. 
Freedom from discrimination: potential developments under Article 14 read 
with Articles 2, 3, 8
In restrictive abortion regimes it is argued that women suffer discriminatory limitation 
of access to healthcare services on grounds of gender since in such regimes there is 
evidence of a reluctance of doctors to diagnose certain conditions or treat pregnant 
women for them, where the foetus could be threatened; this argument was made in the 
application of RR v Poland88 by the International Reproductive and Sexual Health 
Law Programme. This has been further recognised by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe which by Principle 10 indicates that prenatal genetic diagnosis, 
a healthcare service intimately linked with abortion services, must be supplied without 
discrimination.89 Further, since pregnancy is unique to women, but can pose severe 
health risks to them, denial of abortion/related healthcare services can be viewed as a 
form of discriminatory treatment. As emphasised by CEDAW in its General 
Recommendation 24, ‘denial of health needs specific to women constitutes a form of 
discrimination against women’.90
Article 14 provides that ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex…’. 
Article 14 is therefore prima facie applicable to the denial of abortion-related or other 
healthcare services which affect only women, or where denial of diagnostic tests or 
treatment for non-pregnancy related conditions occurs due to women’s reproductive 
function. However, Article 14 does not provide a free standing right – it must be read 
‘with’ another Article of the Convention. It is not necessary for there to be a breach of 
                                                
88 Written Comments by the International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Programme, 
University of Toronto, Faculty of Law 28th September 2007 R.R. v Poland (App no 27617/04) at p 1.
89 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation No.R(90)13, 21 June 1990.
90 Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 7 (2004) HRC General Recommendation No 24 UN Doc A/54/38 at 5.
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the accompanying Article; rather, the claim must merely fall within the ambit of that 
Article.91 As indicated above, restrictive abortion regimes are associated with a 
number of potential violations of women’s Convention rights. Tysiąc and 
Brüggemann92 made it clear that restrictive access to abortion can found an Article 8 
claim – in other words, the adverse impact on women can fall within the ambit of Art 
8(1). 
The comparator problem in this context
Case law on Article 14 at Strasbourg relies on adverting to a comparator to establish 
that a difference of treatment has occurred.93 That requirement causes a problem in 
relation to certain solely pregnancy-related issues, such as access to abortion, since 
there is no obvious male equivalent to a pregnant woman and therefore no ‘persons in 
relevantly similar situations’ are available, as case-law requires.94 However, where the 
discrimination relates to general provision of healthcare services denied to a woman 
due to risk to her pregnancy, the comparator would arguably be a man accessing 
similar healthcare services. This argument is given some support on the basis that the 
Court has so far rejected the argument that differing treatment on grounds of gender is 
justified merely by reference to differing reproductive functions in other contexts.95 In 
relation to access specifically to abortion services it might be argued that identifying a 
direct comparator is inappropriate and so the Court should have regard to the general 
context of discrimination. Court jurisprudence in relation to Article 14 is not
consistent in relation to the requirement of a comparator – while it is always necessary 
to demonstrate differential treatment between two classes that does not always require 
a detailed analysis of whether the applicant is in a relevantly analogous situation.96
                                                
91 See further Abdulaziz (n 3), at para 82; R Wintemute, ‘Within the Ambit: How Big Is the ‘‘Gap’’ in 
Article 14 European Convention on Human Rights?’; A Baker ‘The Enjoyment of Rights and 
Freedoms: A New Conception of the ‘Ambit’ under Article 14 ECHR’ (2006) 69 MLR 714.
92 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 29). See also Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at paras 107-110.
93 Lithgow and others v United Kingdom, (App nos 9006/80, 9262/81, 9263/81, 9265/81, 9266/81, 
9313/81, 9405/81) (1986) 9 EHRR 329. Rasmussen v Denmark (A/87); (1984) 7 EHRR 371.
94 Zarb Adami v Malta (App no 17209) (2006) 44 EHRR 49 at para 71. This requirement has provoked 
criticism of the Court’s jurisprudence on gender by feminist commentators who advert to the lack of 
protection against gender-based discrimination in the reproductive context: see eg I Radacic ‘Gender 
Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 841.
95 Van Raalte v The Netherlands (App no 20060/92) (1997) 24 EHRR 503.
96 Pine Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland (A/222) (1991) 14 EHRR 319 at paras 14-17.
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Therefore an applicant could argue that the ground of discrimination was the fact of 
her pregnancy on the basis that only women can become pregnant, echoing the stance 
under EU law in relation to access to employment in which pregnancy is a prohibited 
ground of discrimination in itself and thus reliance on male comparators has long 
been abandoned.97
The concept of discrimination 
If the comparator hurdle could be overcome, depending on the specifics of the claim, 
it would also be necessary to consider the concept of ‘discrimination’ in Article 14: it 
has been found to denote a difference of treatment without objective and reasonable 
justification – i.e. treatment failing to pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ or where the means 
employed were disproportionate to the aim.98 Member states have been allowed only 
a narrowed margin of appreciation as regards gender – it has been recognised that 
only ‘very weighty reasons’ would satisfy the Court that a difference of treatment 
could be justified based on this ground.99
The accompanying Article 
Articles 8, 3 and 2 are most likely to be found applicable in this context in relation to 
the provision of healthcare services on the basis, as demonstrated above, that those 
Articles have been interpreted to include positive obligations, although it is only in 
relation to Article 8 that the Court has confirmed that domestic access to healthcare 
can be required in certain circumstances by such an obligation. The requirement of 
access to abortion services in reliance on Articles 8 and 14 was raised in Tysiąc by the 
Centre for Reproductive Rights which stated in its Amici brief to the Court100 that: 
Poland’s failure to take effective legal, policy and administrative measures to 
ensure that women can exercise their legal right to abortion in practice 
                                                
97 Directive 92/85/EC Pregnancy and Maternity. See also Webb v EMO Cargo (no 2) [1994] ECR I-
3567 (C-32/93).
98 Fretté v France (App no 35415/97) (2004) 38 EHRR 438 at para 71; Lithgow v United Kingdom 
(1986) 8 EHRR 329 at para 177.
99 Abdulaziz v United Kingdom (n 3) at para 78.
100 Tysiąc v Poland (App no 5410/03) Written Comments by Center for Reproductive Rights, 21 Sept 
2005 at para 43.
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disproportionately disadvantages women over men and violates women’s 
right to non-discrimination in the enjoyment of their other human rights.101
This argument was not considered by the Court although it did not dismiss the point; 
rather, it was not thought that the question of discrimination raised issues going 
beyond the primary Article 8 claim.102 An argument of this type was also raised by the 
International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Programme in its submission to 
the Court in the application of RR v Poland: it argued that the Court should find a 
violation of Article 14 read with Articles 8 and 3 due to the ‘historical patterns of 
paternalism and sexism in the delivery of reproductive health services’.103
A difference of treatment on grounds of gender could be argued to occur where the 
state interferes with or fails to provide for the full provision of healthcare services due 
to pregnancy. The denial of full health-care to women due to their reproductive 
function was a theme in Chapters 2 and 4, and as argued above may fall within the 
ambit of Article 8(1). Such denial appears to occur in restrictive abortion regimes; for 
example, diagnostic tests or treatment for serious conditions (unrelated to pregnancy) 
may be refused where a foetus could be put at risk. The applicant in Z v Poland104 (see 
above) is making this point in relation to the failure of Poland to establish an 
appropriate framework to regulate the doctors' right to refuse care on moral or 
religious grounds.105 Failure to carry out tests or treatment may be due to institutional 
obstruction stemming from doctors’ religious beliefs and/or from an inhibiting general 
criminal context. The principle of effective access to services also applies in relation 
to carrying out diagnoses to establish that the ‘medical indications’ allowing for an 
abortion for health reasons are present. This principle arises in the application of RR v 
                                                
101 On this point the Center for Reproductive Rights referred further to arguments raised in 
international law – see R Cook and B Dickens Considerations for Formulating Reproductive Health 
Laws (2nd edn, Geneva: WHO, Occasional Paper No. 3, 2000) at p 34.
102 Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 147.
103 Written Comments by the International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Programme (n 88) at 
p 1.
104 Z v Poland (Statement of Facts) (n 83) COMPLAINTS para 6.
105 The challenge is intended to ensure that the Polish government guarantees an adequate number of 
healthcare workers who are willing to provide all legal services and that patients receive timely 
referrals to those workers. It is also asking the Court to affirm that conscientious objection may not be 
invoked by institutions such as hospitals. See at <http://reproductiverights.org/en/case/z-v-poland-
european-court-of-human-rights> accessed 29.09.10. 
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Poland106 in relation to foetal disability and arose in the case of Tysiąc v Poland in 
relation to health risks. It would also apply to tests to establish that a woman falls 
within a general legal exemption from the criminal liability for abortion recognised 
under a Prohibition model, as is the case in relation to C (risk to life and 
chemotherapy treatment) in the ABC case. For Article 14 purposes, the comparator 
could be a man who would be able to obtain unimpeded access to tests or treatment 
for similar or analogous conditions affecting his health. The question of 
proportionality would be determined in the same way as discussed above in relation to 
the same issue under Article 8(2).
A further Article 14 argument could be raised in relation to effective failure to provide 
healthcare services to remedy conditions linked to illegal/extra-territorial abortion, 
including abortion after-care in respect of all three applicants in ABC, or genetic 
counselling as in D v Ireland.107 Where a man suffering from symptoms such as pain 
and bleeding after a minor operation would have access to medical treatment, it would 
arguably be discriminatory to deny it to women or to inhibit them from seeking it in 
the aftermath of an abortion abroad (where they could not access aftercare in the 
hospital or clinic that had performed the abortion, as was the case in respect of all 3 
applicants in ABC, due to the need to return to Ireland). This is one of the key grounds 
of the claim being made in that case; the Grand Chamber could determine the 
question of lack of aftercare under Article 8 alone, but greater pressure would be 
placed on Ireland if the regime was also found to create discrimination on grounds of 
gender. 
Future claims under Article 8 read with 14 that address the matter of de jure access to 
abortion should not be ruled out despite their being unlikely in the short-term due to 
the tentative approach adopted by the Court so far. Such a claim could proceed on 
similar grounds to those discussed above – to the effect that legal restriction of 
abortion where necessary to protect health was discriminatory in that such restrictions 
did not apply to other forms of healthcare. Alternatively, a still more radical argument 
could be advanced that would found a ‘right of access to abortion’ under these 
                                                
106 RR v Poland (n 35).
107 D v Ireland (Admissibility) (n 18).
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Articles: for example that a regime that restricts access to abortion at all stages of 
gestational development is inherently discriminatory on grounds of gender in that it 
denies ‘personal autonomy’ (for instance in relation to the development of personal 
relations – see Brüggemann and Scheuten)108 to fertile women through legal penalties 
directed at them or designed to deny access to facilities, by, for example, prosecuting 
service providers. 
Analogous emergent rights
There are indications as discussed that recognition of a right of access to abortion and 
associated healthcare services under certain Convention Articles may be in the 
process of emerging. An analogy is offered by the transsexual cases at Strasbourg 
which present a model of eventual acceptance of a right by hesitant, incremental steps 
in the social context. UK law did not give full expression to the fundamental interest 
of individuals in determining their own identity. Initially the Court tended to find no 
violation where transsexuals were not accommodated by member states – despite 
recognizing sexual identity as a part of private life under Art 8 – due to a reluctance to 
impose positive obligations and a lack of European-wide consensus.109 This position 
was developed to one where a peculiar lack of accommodation could create a breach 
of Art 8, as in B v France where the breach was found since the civil position of 
transsexuals in terms of recognition of sexual identity in France was worse than that 
pertaining in the UK.110 At this interim stage, while not embracing a fully fledged 
right, the Court demonstrated that it was open to the possibility of doing so; judges 
were sensitive to the general legal status of transsexuals, and arguably receptive to 
accepting reform.111 This was finally developed into an outright acceptance of sexual 
identity as a fully fledged right under Art 8 in Goodwin v UK.112 Acceptance in 
Goodwin of a right to sexual identity meant that transsexuals were accommodated 
                                                
108 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 29) at para 55.
109 Rees v UK (App no 9532/81) (1986) 9 EHRR 56 and Cossey v UK (App no 10843/84) (1991) 13 
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110 B v France (App no 10179/82) (1993) 16 EHRR 1.
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33
within the legal system on the terms they had argued for – i.e. recognised legally as 
being members of their new gender after reassignment. 
The Court in Goodwin noted that there was ‘clear and uncontested evidence of a 
continuing international trend in favour, not only of increased social acceptance of 
transsexuals but also of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative 
transsexuals’. Clearly, there is general legal recognition in Europe of rights of access 
to abortion services and, since a number of countries allow abortion on request (see 
Chapter 3), abortion rights could be said to be generally recognised with only a few 
exceptions in Europe.113 It was also noted in Goodwin that the UK Government was 
currently discussing proposals that would have facilitated the amendment of records 
so that transsexuals might be recognised.114 The Court made the point that respect for 
dignity and autonomy underlies the Convention rights, especially Article 8. In the 
Goodwin case these foundational values led to acceptance of control over identity. In 
relation to the right of transsexuals to marry the Court argued that the right itself was 
not within the state’s margin of appreciation, even if the conditions under which it 
was recognised were, despite the fact that the majority of states failed to provide for 
transsexual marriage rights.  
Similarly, the development of Article 8 and 14 jurisprudence to protect the right of 
gay people to engage in homosexual practice without interference (Dudgeon v United 
Kingdom)115 was followed by recognition of the right to be free from discrimination 
on that ground in relation to adoption in EB v France.116 Six years prior to EB the 
Court had narrowly held in Fretté v France117 that restriction on gay adoption with the 
aim of protecting the child’s welfare was within the state’s margin of appreciation, 
paying particular regard to the lack of a uniform approach to the issue.118 As seen 
                                                
113 Eg Tysiąc v Poland (n 1) at para 103.
114 Goodwin v United Kingdom (n 112) at para 86.
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116 EB v France (App no 43546/02) 47 EHRR 21. The French adoption board had emphasised the gay 
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held was impermissible at para 96.
117 Fretté v France (App no 36515/97) 38 EHRR 438.
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the latter case. EB v France (n 116) at para 74-8.
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above in relation to transsexuals, the Court altered its position primarily to bring the 
Convention into line with modern attitudes – highlighting that the Convention is a 
‘living instrument’.119 As in Tysiąc120 the Court’s approach in EB avoided the central 
question whether homosexual adoption is required by the Convention, but stressed 
that the important principle of non-discrimination was at issue in the case;121 thus the 
Court followed a line of jurisprudence upholding the rights of homosexuals against 
the policy of certain contracting parties – establishing a significant role for the Court 
in extending gay rights. 
Conclusions 
As in the above examples of analogous emergent rights, the Court may be 
approaching a position on abortion where it is prepared to safeguard, even if
indirectly, some concept of reproductive autonomy under Convention rights, even in 
this difficult sphere, in particular as regards abortion in the first trimester. At present it 
may be most likely to find a violation of Article 8 (or possibly 2) where there is 
already state provision for abortion, albeit on narrow grounds, which appears to be 
ineffective, placing women’s health or life at risk – a relatively slight incremental step 
from the outcome of Tysiąc. It may also be prepared to go further and find that 
impaired access to general healthcare services and/or to abortion aftercare due to a 
very restrictive approach to abortion, may lead to a breach of Article 8, possibly read 
with Article 14, as is argued in ABC.122 However, it is less likely to confront the 
question, posed in ABC, of whether abortion should be available to obviate a serious 
risk to the mother’s health, where her life would not be placed at risk otherwise, thus 
pressurising Ireland to introduce a new exception to its prohibition and amending its 
Constitution in order to avoid being in breach of Article 8. This cannot necessarily be 
ruled out, however, on the basis of the margin of appreciation, since the cases 
establishing the relevance of the doctrine – Paton123 and Vo124 – were cases in which 
the applicant sought to restrict or penalize abortion. In contrast, in Tysiąc and Open 
                                                
119 See eg Tyrer vthe United Kingdom (A/26) 1979-89 2 EHRR 1 at para 31.
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122 ABC v Ireland (n 2) COMPLAINTS para 4.
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Door125 the Court refused to extend the margin of appreciation doctrine to this issue. 
It is therefore arguable that the momentum at Strasbourg is currently one in favour of 
provision of access to abortion since cases involving the extension of ‘abortion 
rights’, not their limitation, elicit a more expansive response. 
ABC v Ireland has the potential to ensure that the Court confronts this issue more 
directly, as it has done in other cases concerning the evolutive development of Article 
8 rights, including Goodwin126 and EB. As Chapter 4 explained, in so doing it would 
reflect general trends in international human rights law, and in particular the stance of 
CEDAW as to the impact on women of restrictive abortion regimes. The 
conceptualisation of reproductive rights as human rights is still an emergent trend but, 
as Chapter 4 explained, it appears to be quite firmly rooted in recent developments in 
the international human rights law field in general. If the Grand Chamber does deliver 
an historic decision in ABC, seeking a radical overhaul of Ireland’s restrictive regime, 
it would be bringing itself more closely into line with that current tendency. It is thus 
possible that ABC v Ireland could become, in effect, the ‘Roe v Wade’127 of Europe in 
relation to the handful of states with very restrictive abortion regimes: however, it has 
been pointed out that the Grand Chamber has bases for finding breaches of the ECHR, 
but without putting Ireland in the position where, to address a breach of one or more 
Convention rights, it would have to create a new exception allowing access to 
abortion.
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1Chapter 6 : Conclusions
The opportunity for Strasbourg to recognise abortion rights under the Convention was 
missed in Brüggemann v Germany1 30 years ago, contrasting tellingly with the 
famous Roe v Wade2 judgment by the American Supreme Court four years earlier. In 
that case the Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantee of privacy3 as part 
of its protection for procreative autonomy4 encompassed the decision to have an 
abortion. It held that state regulation affecting the availability of abortion was 
legitimate in so far as it was intended to protect the health of the women before 
viability and only after viability could it be justified by reference to the potentiality of 
human life.5 In contrast in Brüggemann the Commission accepted that abortion 
involved the right to the private life in terms of intimate sexual relations, but was not 
prepared to draw from that the conclusion that at certain stages of foetal development 
the mother had a ‘right’ to choose an abortion.6 After Brüggemann when the issue of 
abortion has arisen, as this thesis has shown, Convention institutions have either 
found doubtful grounds for declaring the case inadmissible (D v Ireland)7 or have 
avoided making a determination as to the more far-reaching claims (Tysiąc).8
However, the approach of the ECtHR to the issue of access to abortion is necessarily 
somewhat more tentative than the approach in national jurisdictions such as America.9
The matter of abortion can be intimately linked to issues of national sovereignty, 
particularly so in relation to Ireland which enshrines protection of the foetus 
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Rights (2nd edn, Oxford OUP, 2009) at p 34-6.
2specifically in its constitution10 and, together with Malta, has negotiated special 
exceptions for their regimes in EU law.11 Furthermore, abortion is a religiously, 
politically and theoretically controversial matter, as the Court has acknowledged.12
Therefore the ‘politics’ of the Court as a European institution encourages an evasive 
stance and this explains the meagre and timid jurisprudence on abortion-related 
issues. 
The Court’s stance so far is therefore one that that avoids the issue of creation of 
‘abortion rights’, as recognised in Roe v Wade, but in Open Door13 and Tysiąc it 
demonstrated that it is prepared find a rights violation in respect of less far-reaching 
claims relating to abortion services arising from very restrictive abortion regimes. The 
violation of Article 8 suffered by Alicia Tysiąc – the ‘fear and distress’ caused by the 
failure of Poland’s restrictive abortion regime to operate clearly and effectively – has 
been described by the leading commentator as one of the key causes of suffering for 
women seeking to access legal abortions in such regimes.14 Nevertheless, the Court’s 
acceptance that the suffering of women caused by restrictive abortion regimes can be 
conceptualised as rights violations has been equivocal – its boldest decision, Tysiąc, 
turned most obviously on the question of procedure, rather than evincing any 
determination to address the substantive failings of the Polish regime, which lead 
many women to seek illegal abortions.15
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15 See further J Gher & C Zampas ‘Abortion as a Human Right: International and regional standards’ 
(2008) HRL Rev 8(2) 249 at 279.
3The narrow basis for the finding of a breach of Article 8 in Tysiąc meant that the 
decision could be met by a response that had a marginal impact on the abortion 
regime in Poland,16 barely alleviating the suffering of women there. Concerns have 
been raised in relation to the effectiveness of the measures employed by Poland as the 
response to the Tysiąc decision; in particular it has been pointed out that the measures 
adopted do not address the specific circumstance of abortion,17 allowing women who 
come within the exceptions accepted by Poland as permitting an abortion can obtain 
one in practice. Thus the measures adopted as a ‘response’ to Tysiąc are likely to be 
of little effect in aiding women in Alicia Tysiąc’s situation. Undoubtedly, Poland’s 
minimal response stemmed in part from the equivocal nature of the decision. A 
similar response was evident in Ireland after the Open Door case18 because it 
concerned the rights of the provider of the service rather than the woman. Also, as 
Chapter 2 points out, the provision of further information came with a price since it 
appears that Irish women are also given misleading information as to the dangers of 
abortion.
However, despite the fact that the Court, perhaps due to the sensitivity of the issue, 
presented the case as one relating to general medical procedure in Tysiąc, it is 
contended that it was clearly concerned with rights violations in Poland stemming 
from its abortion regime.19 The Court’s findings should be viewed in light of 
institutional developments in the Council of Europe indicating that members should 
be concerned about certain forms of restrictive abortion regulation.20 The focus in the 
Tysiąc judgement was on the general context of abortion regulation in Poland21 and of 
particular import is the fact that the violation was sustained by a woman seeking an 
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18 Human Rights Watch ‘A State of Isolation: The State of Abortion for Women in Ireland’ (Jan 2010) 
at p 1-2 <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/01/28/state-isolation> accessed 29.09.10. 
19 See eg Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 14) at p 372-3.
20 Doc 11537 (8 April 2008) Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in Europe Rapporteur: G Wurm 
Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men April 2008 at Pt A Paras 4 and 7.
21 Tysiąc v Poland (n 8) at para 114-30.
4abortion within the regime. As Priaulx has argued,22 the Tysiąc case tests the outer 
limits of the discretion that the Court is prepared to concede to restrictive regimes. 
Despite the apparent limitation of the Tysiąc decision to procedure, in so far as it 
addresses the disparity between the legal oversight and practical implementation of 
restrictive abortion regimes, it provides a basis for substantive recognition that 
Convention rights may encapsulate other forms of women’s suffering in such regimes.
Regulation of abortion within restrictive regimes inevitably demonstrates a disparity 
between the legal permission or exemption from punishment under which a woman 
may access abortion services, and the practice of (usually) medical personnel who 
control this access; they are in effect acting as the guardians of women’s rights. In 
Poland and Ireland, for example, the Catholic doctrine on foetal life as beginning 
from conception gains a great deal of acceptance in the population, and therefore 
medical personnel may use their position to deny women’s rights in relation to 
abortion and associated services. This is particularly evident in relation to reluctance 
to diagnose a condition that might lead a woman to seek an abortion, one of the key 
issues raised in ABC v Ireland.23 A violation of Article 8 is most likely to be found in 
ABC in relation to the issue of obstructiveness of medical personnel, since such a 
finding would still allow the Court to maintain its evasive stance on ‘abortion rights’ 
and would not require it to take a clear stance on the status of the foetus.  Therefore 
Tysiąc may be considered a ‘breakthrough’ case, creating the basis for future 
decisions recognising emergent rights of women in restrictive abortion regimes in line 
with the incremental development the Court has recognised in other sensitive areas.
While the Tysiąc judgement is an important first step, it did not touch on the key 
matter of discrimination on grounds of gender in restrictive abortion regimes. The 
Strasbourg Court has been trenchantly criticised by some feminist commentators for 
its lack of receptivity to the most severe forms of gender-based discrimination in the 
reproductive context,24 but in the years since Brüggemann the Court has been able to 
avoid considering the application of such arguments in relation to abortion. Recently 
                                                
22 Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 14).
23 ABC v Ireland (Statement of Facts) (App no 25579/05), lodged 15 July 2005 COMPLAINTS para 
3.
24 See eg I Radacic ‘Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 
19 EJIL 841, 856-7. See further Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n 14) at 379.
5Priaulx has criticised the Tysiąc judgement as failing to deal with this substantive 
issue which would have had far more significance, she argues, for women generally 
as part of an overall goal of advancing gender equality, but particularly so for women 
in Poland.25 In this respect the ECHR is out of line with international human rights 
law which is increasingly conceptualising forms of restrictive regulation that affect 
women’s access to healthcare as particularly invidious forms of discrimination,26
recognising that it restricts women’s full participation in ‘social, political and 
economic activities’.27 The recognition that women, in being denied effective respect 
for their legal rights under restrictive abortion regimes, suffer discrimination based on 
gender contrary to Article 14 would be a symbolic affirmation that such regimes 
uniquely affect women’s rights. The case of ABC represents a real possibility that the 
Court will address this weakness since so doing would not affect the Court’s stance in 
relation to the rights of the foetus: no right of access to abortion need be contemplated 
since the discrimination could be found to relate to the particular types of harm and 
distress that result from ineffective abortion regulation.
The preceding discussion has assumed that the position of the Court as regards the 
role of the margin of appreciation doctrine in relation to the beginning of life or 
‘foetal status’ under the Convention, as evinced by the statements made in Vo and in 
Evans, is tenable and could justifiably restrict the applicability of the Convention to 
restrictive abortion regimes. It is, however, the conclusion of this thesis that 
conceding an unlimited margin of appreciation to the state to determine the point at 
which life begins is not possible for an instrument of human rights protection. Firstly, 
foetal status, central to the justification for restrictive abortion regulation, is not 
straightforwardly a matter of protection of ‘rights’ by the Convention; rather, it poses 
the question of what a being under the Convention is in the first place. It is not 
logically consistent to use a theory of subsidiarity which refers to the way member 
states protect the rights under the Convention to justify non-interference of the Court 
                                                
25 Priaulx ‘Testing the Margin of Appreciation’ (n14) at 378.
26 For example, the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the 
International Convention on Social and Economic rights; see further chapter 4 pp 4-5. As Rebecca 
Cook has argued, barriers to safe abortion are usually part of a wider scheme of neglect: R Cook and B 
Dickens ‘Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform’ (Feb 2003) HRQ 25 1 p 58 et seq; R 
Cook and S Howard ‘Accommodating Women’s Differences under the Women’s Anti-Discrimination 
Convention’ (2007) Emory LJ 56 at 1041.
27 Cook and Howard ‘Accommodating Women’s Differences’ (n 26) at 1044.
6with a question of whether direct protection under the Convention is permissible as 
the Court sought to do in Vo v France.28 This has certain similarities with the 
argument that states had a latitude to treat the foetus as a constitutional person in the 
United States before Roe v Wade (and therefore that the case was wrongly decided)29
which Dworkin convincingly rebutted on similar grounds.30
Secondly, as conceded by the Commission in Paton v UK, the ‘everyone’ in Article 2 
could not be construed as intended to refer to the foetus, bearing in mind the nature of 
that Article and the Convention as a whole (although it held that such an interpretation 
could not necessarily be excluded).31 Furthermore, the definition of ‘life’ assumed by 
the Commission in that case was qualified so that the woman’s right to life 
automatically prevailed over that of the foetus, which would also suggest that the 
foetus could not be made the subject of the direct protection of that Article since a 
truly separate being could never automatically find its right to life trumped by 
another’s equal right to life. Thirdly, the argument that abstract philosophical 
disagreement about the beginning of life, as raised in Vo v France,32 should deprive 
the Convention of a role is weakened in relation to regimes such as Ireland left with 
archaic and particularly extreme laws due to political stagnation; as the Irish 
Constitutional Review Group states: ‘[p]hilosophers and scientists may continue to 
debate when human life begins but the law must define what it intends to protect’.33  
Therefore the conclusion that the Court reached in Vo is not sound – the member 
states’ decision as to when life begins for the purpose of Article 2 is not, on this 
argument, within their margin of appreciation. This is surely accurate as it would 
imply that a Convention signatory could define the basis of legal personality under the 
                                                
28 A Plomer ‘A foetal Right to life? The case of Vo v France (2005) HRL Rev 311 at 331. The margin 
of appreciation doctrine employed by the Court has been criticised generally for being ad hoc see eg A 
Lester ‘Universality Versus Subsidiarity: A Reply’ (1998) 1 EHRLR 73.
29 R Dworkin Life’s Dominion An Argument about abortion and euthanasia (Harper Collins, 1993) at 
p 114.
30 In Life’s Dominion (n 29) at p 114 arguing that states cannot have the ability to adjust the 
‘constitutional population’ as that begs the question of the whole constitutional arrangement.
31 Referring to Article 6(1) as it applied to access to a court, considered in Reeve v United Kingdom 
(App no 24844/94) Commission Decision of 30th November 1994.
32 Vo v France (n 12) at para 82.
33 Constitutional Review Group Report 1996 “The Right to Life (Unborn and Mother)” Arts 40-44 at p 
252 cited in S Donnelly ‘A, B and C v Ireland: will the European Court of Human Rights address 
Ireland’s Restrictive Abortion Law?’ (2010) 1 MLJI 16, 20.
7Convention to exclude certain people arbitrarily. The Court in Vo should therefore be 
interpreted in abortion cases as conceding a general margin of appreciation as to the 
way the state protects the foetus indirectly under Convention Articles, or alternatively 
as a justification for infringement ‘necessary in a democratic society’; the separate 
matter of when life is protected under the Convention is simply indeterminate. 
Unlike the situation in Brüggemann,34 30 years ago, European abortion regimes are 
now more readily capable of being considered generally justifiable under the 
Convention without direct protection for the foetus at an early stage of gestational 
development. For instance, counselling and consent requirements could be justified by 
reference to indirect protection of foetal life under the Convention, either due to the 
profound moral status of the foetus35 or to protection for the rights of others, including 
those of the women themselves, as was found in Roe v Wade.36 These requirements 
would not justify interference with women’s fundamental rights, such as the 
fundamental liberty to determine the disposal of one’s body, which are involved in the 
termination of pregnancy.  
In light of this, despite the relative stagnation of the Convention institutions on the 
substantive issue since the Commission decision in Brüggemann, the Convention is an 
institution capable of extending recognition of rights violations in restrictive abortion 
regimes that derive directly from denial of access to abortion services. The Court may 
be likely to develop protection for women in this context in an incremental fashion 
analogous to the emergence of protection for transsexual and homosexual persons. 
For example, a decision in relation to Ireland, raised in the ABC37 case, but unlikely to 
succeed in light of Vo and the tentative procedural approach in Tysiąc,38 could require 
Ireland to provide a domestic abortion regime – thus, it could find that the (unofficial) 
requirement that Irish women must travel abroad for an abortion violates a 
                                                
34 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (n 1).
35 For instance recognition of the profound status of the moral view that the foetus is a human being 
referred to by the European Centre for Law and Justice in its 2008 brief to the Court on ABC (n 23) at 
para 14 referring to Vo v France (n 12) at para 82. Ronald Dworkin makes a similar argument in 
relation to the potential ‘detached’ interest in foetal life – i.e. an interest not based on a being with 
interests conceptualised as human rights – that could justify certain burdens on the availability of 
abortion: see Life’s Dominion (n 29) at p 149-51. 
36 Roe v Wade (n 5) at p 164-5.
37 ABC v Ireland (n 23).
38 Tysiąc v Poland (n 8).
8Convention guarantee. While this issue concerns the matter of substantive access to 
abortion, it is not one that lies entirely outside the approach in Tysiąc and Open 
Door39 in that the right to have an abortion without state interference is enjoyed by the 
elements of the Irish population with the means to travel. It does not therefore impose 
new rights in practice, but it would require the creation of a new legal right to have an 
abortion in Ireland. This obligation, most relevant to jurisprudence under Articles 3 
and 8, is more likely to be found in relation to fundamental indications such as 
pregnancy due to rape or fatal foetal disability at first, but it could extend to risks to 
health as is claimed by the applicants in ABC v Ireland. 
The ideal development in terms of protection of women’s rights in restrictive regimes, 
however, is for Strasbourg to abandon entirely its tentative procedural approach40 and 
decide, as in Roe v Wade, that access to abortion is required in states where it is 
currently denied both in law and fact. That is most likely to be recognised in relation 
to narrow and profound indications as was found in 2006 by the Human Rights 
Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in KL v Peru41
in relation to fatal foetal impairment, but there is no reason to find that abortion on 
‘demand’ (with or without a counselling requirement) could not be encompassed by 
the woman’s right to private life, as the Commission contemplated in Brüggemann, 
and as has been the approach in the courts of a number of national jurisdictions. A 
substantive development is the only way to genuinely defend women’s rights in 
restrictive abortion regimes. While the Court’s decision in Tysiąc shows the first signs 
that the Convention can be relied on to check a nascent revival in Europe, based on 
Catholicism, of anti-abortion sentiment, the Convention mechanism has the potential 
to protect women to a much greater extent. 
                                                
39 Open Door Counselling v Ireland (n 13).
40 See in relation to Poland in general M Dembour and M Krzyzanowska-Mierzewska ‘Ten years on: 
the voluminous and interesting Polish case law’ (2004) 5 EHRLR esp 528-9 and 543. See also M 
Dembour Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention (CUP 2006) p 206. 
By procedural it is meant a type of constitutional adjudication on the basis of the narrow conception of 
the ‘rule of law’ as requiring fairness in legal procedures, typically in the criminal context see eg V 
Ramraj ‘Four Models of Due Process’ (2004) 2 ICLJ 492, 497 et seq.
41 KL v Peru (1153/2003), CC{R/DC/85/D/1153/2003 (2005); 13 IHRR (2006); see chapter 4 pp 5-6.
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